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Chapter One: Introduction
The fall of the New Order and the rapid decentralization that Indonesia underwent
subsequently greatly changed the landscape of Indonesian politics. For one, communities
suddenly had much more opportunity to participate in local governance. The effects of
this were broad-sweeping, and out of these changes grew a variety of social and political
movements, which, after the fall of Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998, became able to
mobilize and advocate more openly. Specifically, ethnic politics then were able to
participate in discourse safely; Suharto’s dictatorial regime had for decades denied the
existence of all indigenous groups in Indonesia, and its end thus signaled a promising
new political climate for indigenous communities. This transformation was particularly
meaningful for the Dayaks, an indigenous group of Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of
Borneo, who in recent years have adopted an increased role in political participation.
Subsequently, ethnic politics in Kalimantan in the 21st century have been central to
framing the ways in which local Dayak communities interact with greater Indonesian
institutions.
Alongside this rapid decentralization, since the fall of Suharto, the Indonesian
government has grappled with issues of sustainable development. The government has
had to balance, on one hand, international pressures to reduce carbon emissions and
protect biodiversity, and on the other, the interests of large, natural resource-intensive
industries. One of the foremost of these issues is related to customary land rights. Until
recently, all forests in Indonesia had been under state ownership, which allowed the state
to sell concessions, such as for oil palm plantations, at will (Butt 2014, 59). However, a
2013 Constitutional Court ruling reclassified customary forests as separate from state-
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owned forests, and now, with growing Dayak mobilization and activism, conflicts over
land tenure have become increasingly common (Warassih and Sulaiman 2017).
Historically, the Dayaks have been particularly reliant on forests for their
livelihoods, using, typically, a combination of swidden farming and diversification of
forest products. These sorts of livelihoods, however, have been threatened by a changing
natural environment, which constricts the livelihood options of Dayak communities.
Dayak identity, the topic of Chapter 2, is central to issues of land tenure because the law
now requires communities to prove that they have maintained their indigenous
institutions in order to substantiate customary land claims. Thus, the maintenance of
Dayak forest management systems, including swidden farming, is important. Such Dayak
forestry practices will be the focus of Chapter 3. The above threats to Dayak livelihoods
often have stemmed from government efforts portrayed as promotions of sustainable
practices. Popular perceptions that swidden agriculture is damaging, and portrayals of the
Dayak people as backward and uneducated, have legitimized government land-grabbing,
regardless of the falsehood of these beliefs (McWilliam 2006). Overlapping regulations
and claims to tenure complicate these issues further, and will be discussed in Chapter 4.
On one hand, the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia clarifies in Article 33 (3) that the
government holds the absolute rights to control land, water, and resources. Thus, the
Indonesian state, and more specifically the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, has the
ultimate authority over the management of forest resources. On the other hand, series of
recent legal rulings have created opportunities for the Dayaks and other indigenous
groups by recognizing customary land rights for the first time. For example, after years of
repeated incarcerations of protestors who have attempted to organize against corporate
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land grabs, articles of the 2004 Plantation Act were dropped after being ruled
unconstitutional for discrimination against indigenous people (Butt 2014). Furthermore, a
later ruling from the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2013 promised to grant
ownership of state land to back to indigenous groups holding customary rights with some
conditions (Ibid.). Prior to this ruling, communities of indigenous people, including the
Dayaks, had been forcibly removed from their traditional lands for economic activities
like oil palm plantations or mining, or had little control over the management of such
land.
While rulings like these are promising, local activists have claimed that in
actuality, little has been done to implement them (Nugroho 2019). As mentioned above,
the Indonesian state has added a stipulation that, in order for groups to qualify as
indigenous, they must be able to prove that they have maintained their adat, or customary
laws and institutions (Asien et al. 2017). As a result, the ways in which indigeneity has
been defined by the Indonesian state have required that in order to receive customary land
rights, they must prove that their own institutions have continued to exist in a more or
less static state over decades (Lounela 2017, 133). Thus, one challenge for Dayaks in
working around issues of land tenure has been that they must demonstrate that they in
fact have maintained these institutions. However, this is a rather vague idea in practice,
and there is not yet an established procedure for gaining government recognition.
Regardless, these do signal a shift in discourse; Indonesia’s official view on
indigeneity historically has been that all Indonesians are ‘indigenous’, or, in effect, that
no one is. Because of this, before the fall of the New Order, it was nearly impossible to
bring the issue of customary land claims to the national political agenda. With much
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lobbying from activists, however, the state now recognizes the masyarakat adat, or
indigenous communities (Li 2001). Therefore, much more opportunity exists now for
indigenous advocacy, and, as will be discussed later, Dayak identity constructions have
been placed at the forefront of many of these efforts. In part, this has been used as a
means to demonstrate the maintenance of indigenous institutions.
More recently, however, some legislative barriers have existed. For one, a new
law, the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (PPHMHA)
was drafted in 2015, but was stalled in Parliament in 2016 (Rogers 2016). The proposed
legislation was opposed strongly by the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, which
historically has been quite controversial. At the time, the Ministry had been under
investigation by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), in part over a case
where high-ranking officials were involved in the illegal distribution of permits with
support from the Ministry of Forestry itself (Oesterheld 2016). While the government has
indeed made efforts to reduce corruption and increase transparency, mistrust of the
government has continued to be a persistent issue for local communities.
Nevertheless, the primary NGO pushing for the passage of the PPHMHA is the
Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago (AMAN), which has played a great
role in lobbying for the recognition of the rights of indigenous people—including the
Dayaks (AMAN n.d.). Regardless, because of how the Indonesian state has defined
indigeneity, Dayak identity constructions have become a focal point for activists as a
means to encourage a rather diverse set of communities to mobilize as a unified group.
This is one reason why the use of Dayak cultural symbols and ethnic pride have risen in
recent years (Sillander and Alexander 2016, 99).
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This has been a significant turn from a long history of Dayak marginalization,
dating back to Dutch colonization. The term “Dayak”, even, was originally imposed
externally, by Bornean Malays (Tanasaldy 2012) and encompasses quite a large body of
people; there are by some estimates around 450 ethnolinguistic Dayak groups who live
throughout Borneo (Minority Rights Group International 1997), although many of them
share a number of common cultural practices both in language and in customary laws.
Borneo itself is shared by three countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Furthermore,
the Indonesian part of Borneo is divided into the provinces of West Kalimantan, Central
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan. Because of this diversity, this
thesis will focus in particular on the Dayaks of West Kalimantan.
West Kalimantan was chosen, first, because it still has significant forest cover, a
large indigenous population, and some community-based forest management programs
have already been established there. Second, West Kalimantan’s capital, Pontianak, has
been the site of much activist activity, and, as the most populous city in Kalimantan
generally, it has been a historical center for Dayak politics. It should be noted, however,
that the Dayaks are a small minority within the population of Pontianak; the majority of
Dayaks live in rural areas outside of the city.
This thesis will examine Dayak identity constructions and how they have been
and are currently being used to assert customary land rights in forested areas of West
Kalimantan. Involved in this will be a study of how the Dayaks have used these
constructions to fit definitions of indigeneity as prescribed by the Indonesian state, as
well as how Dayak activists are employing these constructions to demonstrate that their
indigenous institutions indeed have been maintained. In addition, current forestry policy

5

6

and government programs will be studied, as well as how these may be improved to
better fit the needs of indigenous communities. A few questions will be raised: What
aspects of identity must be maintained in order to be sufficient to claim customary land
rights under Indonesian law? How has recent Dayak mobilization fed into a resurgence in
Dayak identity and pride, and vice versa? What opportunities does this hold for
conservation and sustainable development?
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Chapter Two: Dayak identity
In Indonesia, Dayak identity has suffered from the imposition of a variety of
stereotypes strengthened by decades of popular discourse. On one hand, the Dayaks often
are seen as traditional and close to nature, which might legitimize their historical
knowledge of sustainable practices. One the other, a perception also exists of the Dayaks
as violent and primitive, which has justified their past exclusion even further. For the
most part, these stereotypes often have been quite damaging, as they have served as a
basis for the marginalization of Dayak communities for centuries (Henley and Davidson
2013).
Yet in more recent years, West Kalimantan has witnessed a reconstruction of
Dayak identity. Dayak communities have appropriated these once-harmful images as a
means for mobilization and as a strategy to address a variety of political, economic, and
environmental challenges. This has contributed to the development of a more united
Dayak community that has been strengthened through a common struggle (Sillander and
Alexander 2016). This chapter will examine Dayak identity constructions and how these
have fed into popular perceptions of the Dayaks through history, and further how Dayak
activists in more recent years have increasingly employed Dayak identity symbols, and
with what effect.
An introduction to Dayak culture
When examining Dayak identity constructions, it is useful to first discuss Dayak
culture. As mentioned previously, the term Dayak has been applied to a diverse range of
groups across Borneo. There are seven main Dayak groups, classified by their larger
respective linguistic groups: Iban (Sea Dayak), Bidayuh (Land Dayak), Melanau,
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Kelabit, Kayan, Kenyah, and Penan. Within these larger groups, there are dozens of
smaller ones. Each group usually has its own language as well, with varying degrees of
mutual intelligibility. In addition to linguistic differences, Dayak groups may also differ
in physical appearance. However, common physical traits among the Dayaks tend to be
similar among the mountain peoples of Southeast Asia, ranging as far as Thailand,
Vietnam, and Laos. Cultural practices from Java China, India, and Malaysia also have
had influence (Rubenstein 1985).
Regardless, some common cultural practices exist, which will be a point of focus
for this thesis. The idea that these cultural practices are common is emphasized because
it has been of key significance for Dayak activists and politicians to unite a diverse
range of peoples, all of whom have been labeled Dayak. The use of common symbols is
then important for encouraging the collective mobilization of these groups as a larger
unit. Whether or not this has actually been the case will be an important question for this
thesis, and will be explored throughout.
Another key aspect of Dayak culture is that among different Dayak groups
varying levels of egalitarianism once existed (Jessup and Vayda 1988). The Iban (Sea
Dayaks), for example, were more or less classless. Between Dayak groups, however,
there was some social stratification. For example, the nomadic Penans in Sarawak had no
social classes, yet were seen as inferior by nearby groups with whom they traded forest
products. The Kayans and Kenyahs by contrast were quite hierarchical (Ibid.). These
Dayak groups once even owned slaves. Power in Kayan and Kenyah communities was
extremely concentrated in the hands of village chiefs (maren), who often commanded
large groups of slaves, made up of individuals captured in battles with rivals (Rubenstein
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1985). The practice of slavery persisted among the Dayaks until 1928, after which the
government devised a system whereby Dayaks could be fined for slave ownership. This
was then incorporated into Dayak customary law, which was enforced by the government
court (Ibid.).
The Dayaks also were formerly headhunters, which is one cultural practice that
has very likely contributed to some of the persisting stereotypes of the Dayaks as violent
and backward. This will be expanded upon later in the chapter because of its relevance to
the ways in which more recent violent conflicts between the Dayaks and the Madurese
were framed by the media. However, it is important to note that these practices were, in
actuality, deeply ceremonial. For example, rituals like the kenyalan in Iban, a celebration
of bravery, required fresh human heads. Thus, the more successful Dayak headhunters
often received a certain degree of prestige, as they were seen as contributing to
prosperity-invoking rituals of the community through the supply of heads (Jessup and
Vayda 1988). These heads were usually taken from members of neighboring tribes.
Headhunting as a practice declined significantly towards the end of the 19th century
(Oesterheld 2016).
Cultural practices among the Dayaks generally share at least one common,
fundamental factor: they are governed by adat, or customary law. Because the
Indonesian government has required that indigenous groups demonstrate that they have
maintained their adat institutions to claim customary land ownership, the concept of
adat will be discussed often in this thesis. Larry Kenneth Thomson (2000) describes
adat as “bodies of social and cultural norms, laws, ceremonies, and rituals… founded
on, and intertwined with animistic beliefs” (7). Thus, adat plays a fundamental role in
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Dayak society, and permeates virtually every aspect of community life. For example, it
provides guidance for decisions about when to harvest, when to plant, and for
regulations regarding health and relationships among community members (Thomson
2000, 57). It relies on a worldview that contains both visible and invisible (or spiritual)
parts. Although most Dayaks by now have converted to Christianity or Islam, many
Dayaks still hold expectations that their new religions will guide their lives in the same
ways that their older, more animist beliefs had (Ibid.). However, Islam and Christianity
often do not provide the same breadth of behavioral guidance (Hohne et al. 2018). So,
where their new religions have provided inadequate guidance, adat beliefs often still fill
in the gaps; in fact, in times of crisis, many Dayaks will fall back upon their animist
beliefs (Thomson 2000, 188).
Dayak systems of forest management are also important, as their knowledge of
traditional, sustainable practices has the potential to legitimize their claims to forest
tenure. And, adat law, which governs the extraction of resources from common land,
has shaped these systems. Thus, the relationship between adat law and conservation is
necessarily quite close. There is a clear, farsighted incentive for users to maintain their
shared resources over time, as presumably they will continue to rely on those resources
for the foreseeable future. This is especially true for Dayak communities, which have
lived off of forested land for centuries. A culture surrounding shared resources has
developed slowly during that time, and has been so pervasive that the sharing of
community resources is now deeply engrained into adat law (Mulyoutami, Rismawan,
and Joshi 2009).
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However, historically, the threat of the “tragedy of the commons” has existed.
Some academics feared that individuals, acting in their own self-interest and ignoring
the costs imposed upon others, would exploit common resources, until those resources
were destroyed from overuse (Hardin 1968). This has fed into a belief that in order to
adequately maintain common resources, an authority that governs and restricts them is
necessary.
Yet, a shift in thought, and later, in practice, has demonstrated that this is often
not the case. More recent research has shown that while the “tragedy of the commons” is
a real threat, community-based management programs of common pool resources may
be some of the most effective and sustainable (Ostrom et al. 1999). This is probably true
in the case of the Dayaks. When Dayak households control resources, these are
generally managed with sustainability and conservation in mind (Mulyoutami,
Rismawan, and Joshi 2009). Yet, many community-based forest management programs
in Indonesia, as they exist now, remain quite weak. They often do not allocate
ownership to local communities, they limit local communities’ bargaining power, and
because the existing judicial system is lacking, it is unable to monitor fair agreements
(Liu, Faure, & Mascini 2018, 39). This again emphasizes the importance of establishing
fairer land user rights, which would increase the effectiveness of community-based
forest management programs.
Nonetheless, traditional Dayak systems of forest management are quite
sophisticated. As forest dwellers, the Dayaks employ a diverse variety of land-use
systems, including shared plots (bengkar), and mixed fruit orchards. The success and
management of these rely on a rich understanding of forest systems and how to employ
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these in order to extract resources while minimizing negative impact (Mulyoutami,
Rismawan, and Joshi 2009). The two primary Dayak systems of forest management are
community forest reserves and swidden agriculture. Most Dayak villages own
community forest reserves, which are used primarily for hunting and extraction of
timber, herbs, and wild fruits and vegetables. Large-scale logging is generally
disallowed. Swidden agriculture is the main method by which rice is cultivated, although
it is also used for vegetables, banana, and cassava, among other crops. Swidden is often
closely associated with cultural rituals, particularly in times of harvest. Usually, swidden
is used for household consumption, and not for market (Ibid, 2057). Again, these
traditional, sustainable practices, governed by adat law, play a crucial role in
substantiating Dayak claims to forest user rights.
The complex process of identity formation
One important element of understanding the historical development of Dayak
identity constructions has been the existence of delineated outgroups. It is difficult to tell
precisely what elements become significant in distinguishing between “us” and “them”,
or between an “inside” or an “outside”, but it is quite clear, for the Dayaks, that the
process of forming these groups has been deeply impacted by both cultural and social
factors. Contact between the Dayaks and outsiders has helped define what these
outgroups are, and thus they likely include a diverse, evolving range of actors, ranging
from the Malay Sultanate in the early 20th Century, the Dutch colonizers, and eventually
the modern Indonesian state. To elaborate, these outgroups necessarily give the term
‘Dayak’ meaning, which is shaped through existing Dayak marginality and resistance.
Since the fall of Suharto, Dayak identity has experienced a reconstruction and resurgence,
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as opportunity to do so has opened up under decentralization and the establishment of
liberal democracy in Indonesia (Duile 2017).
Psychological theories of identity are useful in examining how identity might be
formed. One facet of this has been that many scholars agree that while identities may
seem to be unitary, they in fact are defined, in large part, by the groups around them, and
even more so by the establishment of outgroups. The relationships between these
ingroups and outgroups were prominently described by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s, who
suggested that individual identity is constructed based on the social group to which the
individual belongs. Because of this, individuals can enhance their pride and self-esteem
within their ingroup through comparison with outgroups. These ingroups, Tajfel argues,
“may provide a basis for the building up a positive self-image, if it managed to preserve a
system of positive evaluations about its ‘folkways’, mode of life, social and cultural
characteristics.” (Tajfel 1982, 11).
In the case of the Dayaks, the definition of these ingroups and outgroups is
particularly important because it may be useful in explaining some aspects of group
behavior. One might note that the recent flowering of Dayak identity has evolved through
a struggle for recognition and justice within Indonesia. More specifically, decades of
marginalization and conflict with other groups have been harmful to Dayak identity. This
becomes particularly clear if one considers the significant numbers of Dayaks who
converted to Islam in order to shed themselves of their Dayak identity throughout the 20th
century (Tanasaldy 2012, 29).
At the same time, though, through conflict with others, Dayak ingroups
developed, over many years, a set of perceptions of clearly-defined outgroups (Malays,
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the Indonesian State, the Madurese). Perhaps one of the most divisive distinctions, in
some areas of Kalimantan, has been that of orang asli (indigenous person) and pendatang
(newcomer) (Rhee 2009, 46). This has likely fed into a tightening of the Dayak ingroup,
which, united through a common struggle, has now gained more opportunity for
mobilization and activism in the realm of politics and forest tenure. Thus, Dayak identity
constructions have become an important reference point for activists; the use of Dayak
symbols represents a shared identity through which strong community groups can form.
It is also important to note, however, that Tajfel’s theories on social identity have
limits. People belong to more than one social group, and this is particularly true for the
Dayaks. Recall that even the term “Dayak”, after all, was not chosen by the Dayaks, but
instead was popularized by early European explorers (Tanasaldy 2012, 30). And, the
“Dayak” label did not gain acceptance among the Dayaks until the 20th Century
(Sillander and Alexander 2016). Further, people who identify with the term “Dayak”
might also identify with smaller groups, like the Iban or the Kenyah. They also might
identify with larger groups, like Borneans or Indonesians more generally. Thus, while
theories of ingroups and outgroups certainly apply to the Dayaks, it would be misleading
to not acknowledge that identifications with different groups intersect and interact with
one another, and that the Dayaks are no exception.
Development of outgroup perceptions
In discussing Dayak identity reconstructions, it also important to discuss how the
boundaries separating Dayak identity from its outside have formed. Of course, some of
these are clearer than others. Identity is complex, especially for the Dayaks, many of
whom move through and belong to multiple groups. Regardless, like for many
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marginalized communities, history has played a significant role in defining the
relationships between the marginalized and their marginalizers. The Dayaks during the
colonial period experienced severe social exclusion, when differentiations between the
Dayaks and Malay Muslims grew increasingly stark. As Dutch colonization swept
through Borneo, European conceptions of ethnicity were imposed upon the people of
Kalimantan and contributed to the definition of the Dayaks as an island-wide ethnic
group (Tanasaldy 2012, 30). Part of this grew out of a Dutch desire to contain the spread
of Islam by establishing Christianity in its place. Further, the creation of ethnic group
identities under colonial governments has been extensively studied. Some scholars have
found that a range of actors, which might include missionaries, officials, and others, play
a significant role in the construction of ethnic groups, often through the creation or
imposition of ethnic labels (Nagel 1994). In the context of the Dayaks, although these
labels sometimes had been used before colonization, they did not become mainstream
until they were used in censes, reports, or other official documents created by the
colonizing governments (Tanasaldy 2012, 31).
The Dutch delineated the Dayaks in contrast to the Muslim Malays, and because
many Dayaks remained animist in belief, to the Dutch, there was still opportunity for
Dayak “salvation” and conversion to Christianity (Alcorn and Royo 2000). The Dayaks
were also subject to corveé labor and taxation under the Dutch, whereas the Malay elite
were afforded some degree of self-governance and were seen as a source of trade revenue
(Davidson 2003, 3). The Dutch also applied an evolutionary approach to justify the
marginalization of the Dayaks, whereby the Dayaks were seen as less evolved and lowranking compared to their European and Malay counterparts (Duile 2017). The Dutch
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further accused the Dayaks of being incapable of managing their own land, and made
attempts to outlaw shifting cultivation, which had long been the traditional means of
sustenance for Dayak communities (Wadley 2007, 113).
These factors together formed the basis of Dutch rule in Kalimantan and were the
start of the development of a “state” presence in the region. Despite this, the Dayaks
usually favored Dutch rule over the Malay Sultanate; Dutch Christian missionaries set up
the beginnings of a formal education system for the Dayaks and tried to improve Dayak
livelihoods (Tanasaldy 2012, 32). Although these efforts generally were unsuccessful,
some Dayaks continued to favor Dutch rule up until Indonesian independence. And, the
missionary education taught the Dayaks the Western ideals of liberty and democracy,
which provided their activists a foundation upon which the first Dayak political
organizations would later be formed (Davidson 2003, 6).
Many Dayaks who did not become Christian under Dutch rule instead converted
to Islam. The marginalization of the Dayaks during the colonial era, and actually for
decades thereafter, drove many Dayaks to convert. Widespread conversion to Islam, in
fact, even predated colonial rule to the extent that the majority of Malays who lived
upriver, or inland, were once Dayak (Ibid, 4). That is, conversion to Islam represented a
shift not only in religion, but also, in some ways, in ethnicity and culture. For many
Dayaks, to become Muslim was to partially escape the heavily marginalized Dayak
identity and to become, to some degree, Malay (this was a process known as masuk
Melayu, or to “enter” and “become” Malay) (Gerke 1997). These Dayaks, after their
conversion, then became known as Senganan, and tended to distance themselves from
their own Dayak communities quick;y after conversion (Tanasaldy 1981, 33). This also
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sometimes happened through intermarriage, and in cases where Dayaks married Malays,
they often underwent a religious ceremony that both converted them to Islam and
assimilated them with the Malay ethnic group (Gerke 1997).
Often this process consisted of an active renunciation of Dayak identity. In 1997,
Solvay Gerke interviewed one Dayak woman who had married a Kutai Muslim man. She
reported that after her conversion, she was no longer allowed to have any contact with her
own ethnic group, which included being forbidden to visit her parents. She was also made
to give up a number of Dayak culture practices, in which, before her marriage, she had
actively participated. For example, she was no allowed longer to smoke or eat Dayak
food (Gerke, 1997). Remarkably, then, there existed in some ways a distinct, but
permeable delineation between ethnic groups.
Thus, it is also important to note that identities are flexible. In Bornean societies
this is particularly true. Some research has found that a more nuanced approach is crucial
because ethnic standards that impose rigid ethnic categories oversimplify the processes of
identity construction in Borneo (König 2016). The Dayak woman discussed above, for
example, felt that she had not wholly abandoned her Dayak identity despite being made
to leave behind many outward expressions of it. The imposition of ethnic categories
would fail to include this important complexity.
Regardless, for Dayaks who chose to convert to Islam, the advantages were many;
Senganans enjoyed more access to education, avoided higher taxes, and were able to
dissociate themselves from perceptions of the Dayaks as backward, primitive, and
dangerous (Duile 2017). Further, Senganans were generally able to escape much of the
marginalization they had experienced at the hands of the Malays, which for the most part
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had prevented them from participating in social activities beyond those of their own
groups. Because of this, the Dayaks were entirely excluded from participating in any
political activities beyond Dayak communities until Indonesian independence. Later, one
question for activists was whether or not to extend the Dayak label to those who had
previously converted to Islam yet expressed desire to participate in Dayak politics after
World War II (Tanasaldy 2012, 24).
Empowered Dayak communities and their role in governance
During Japanese occupation in the early 1940s, the Dayaks had yet to involve
themselves in politics. Generally, positions of power had been reserved for the bettereducated Malay elite. Yet, the Japanese occupation was important for the later rise of
Dayak politics; the execution of virtually all Malay Sultans revealed to the Dayaks that
the Malays had in fact never been endowed with the supernatural powers that they had
claimed, and therefore had no right to rule the Dayaks (Duile, 2017, 126). Furthermore,
because of the disappearance and execution of the Malay elite under Japanese
occupation, some educated Dayaks were appointed to the newly vacant political positions
when Indonesia was liberated.
By the end of World War II and the early years of Indonesian independence in
1945, the situation of the Dayaks in West Kalimantan began to shift. The Dayaks became
much more involved in politics, as the loss of the local elite under the Japanese paved
way for the installation of a new Dayak elite. In 1945, a group of Dayak schoolteachers,
alongside a few other Dayak leaders, formed the Dayak in Action Party (DIA), which
was transformed into the Dayak Unity Party (PD) a year later. PD then moved to
Pontianak, the administrative center of West Kalimantan (Davidson 2003). Oevaang
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Oeray, a founder of PD, emerged as a leader of the Dayak elite who advocated heavily
for Dayak rights. Oeray would later become a symbol of the birth and development of the
first Dayak political movements.
In addition, with the help of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA),
the Dayak Affairs Office (DAO) was opened in 1946, and became the first organization
established for the sole purpose of handling Dayak affairs. Later in 1946, seven Dayaks
were appointed to the newly created West Kalimantan Council, which consisted of forty
members in total. This was the first time that the Dayaks played an official role in
policymaking. They were also given seats on local councils in a number of districts.
Malay laws that had discriminated against Dayaks and perpetuated inequality were
abolished; for one, it was finally mandated that the Dayaks received equal quality of
education (Tanasaldy 2012).
These sorts of strides, among other policies that increased Dayak participation in
politics despite their comparative lack of experience and education, were in part a result
of the post-war Dutch interim government. This helped secure Dayak support for the
return of Dutch rule after World War II (Ibid, 19). Support from the Dayaks was critical
for the Dutch government because the other significant ethnic group in Kalimantan, the
Malays, were lukewarm at best to the reestablishment of Dutch rule. However, after the
transfer of sovereignty from the colonial government, the new Indonesian government
accused the Dayaks of treason because of their past alignment with the Dutch.
However, not all Dayaks were supportive of the Dutch. It was also at this time
that many Dayaks began to take a notably hostile stance toward colonial rule and its
effects. Oeray argued that Dayak backwardness was not only a result of ignorance, but
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also a result of circumstance after decades of marginalization and discrimination at the
hands of the Dutch and the Malay Sultanate (Davidson 2003, 12-13). This obvious
delineation of outgroups, in contrast to the Dayak ingroup, helped form the foundation
for the Dayak political identity as it exists today.
Importantly, early Dayak leaders were rather bent on “modernizing” Dayak
society. Education presented a significant problem for these leaders. On one hand,
qualified Dayak educators were scarce. On the other, a general distrust existed of
Indonesian teachers from outside of Dayak communities, whom the Dayak leaders feared
would disfavor their students. In promoting modernization, PD leaders also encouraged
Dayak communities to abandon their traditional practices. For example, Dayak
communities were asked to adopt wet-rice cultivation to replace swidden agriculture. PD
leaders also rejected longhouses, and argued that the Dayaks should instead live in singlefamily homes (Davidson 2003, 14). So, the PD was harshly critical of not only the Dutch
and the Malay Sultanate, but also of traditional Dayak practices, which, they believed,
inhibited progress. While the Indonesian government, particularly under Suharto, was
later largely blamed for the forced abandonment of traditional Dayak cultural practices, it
is important to note that early Dayak political leaders also contributed to this.
Regardless, the PD was hugely successful in the first elections in West
Kalimantan, and in the 1958 election, had become the largest ethnic political party in the
province (Duile 2017, 127). However, Dayak politics again fell quiet after the
implementation of President Soekarno’s regulations requiring the disbandment of all
regional political parties for fear of secessionist movements. In the end, the PD was
absorbed by other political parties, and because of this, the strength of Dayak political
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identity declined (Ibid.). It is also important to note, however, that later, under Soekarno,
the Dayaks participated in killings of ethnic Chinese, who had been accused of being
communists in the 1960s (De Jonge and Nooteboom 2006, 204). Thus, the ethnic Chinese
became another outgroup for the Dayaks, even though the Dayaks’ political force had
largely dwindled.
The Suharto Era
President Suharto, who served from 1967 to 1998, suppressed regional politics
even further. Moreover, because Suharto’s highly centralized government denied the
existence of ethnic groups in Indonesia, marginalized groups were prohibited from
receiving preferential treatment. Further, there was very little opportunity for the Dayaks
to participate in centralized governance, as any positions were heavily bureaucratic and
dominated by the Javanese (Tanasaldy 2012, 37). The relative lack of education in Dayak
communities also made participation difficult, as the Dayaks tended to be less qualified.
All of these factors presented barriers for the Dayaks to involve themselves in politics
during the 31-year-long term that Suharto served.
Suharto’s denial of ethnic identity was harmful in other ways. In wanting to unify
national identity, cultural diversity was suppressed (Li 2000). Furthermore, Suharto’s
conception of national identity was heavily biased towards the Javanese, and, as such,
ethnic groups throughout Indonesia had Javanese culture imposed upon them. Another
effect of this was that areas where it was more difficult to impose a culture of national
unity were often labeled as “isolated communities” (Duile 2017, 128). Because of this,
many Dayak communities labeled as isolated became heavily romanticized in popular
discourse and were associated with traditional ways of life.
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Furthermore, Suharto’s regime went on to blame much of Indonesia’s degrading
natural environment on the agricultural practices of the Dayaks, and blamed shifting
cultivation specifically for forest fires and destruction (Ibid, 129). Longhouses, where
numerous Dayak families often lived together, were labeled dirty, unhealthy, and,
subsequently, illegal (Tanasaldy 2012, 40). Some communities were forced by the
Indonesian military to destroy their own homes. The state under Suharto furthermore
delegitimized Dayak animism by recognizing only five religions: Islam, Hinduism,
Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. It was through these measures, among many
others, that Suharto’s regime suppressed indigenous culture and excluded the Dayaks
from the rest of the Indonesian mainstream unless they integrated in ways that the regime
saw fit.
Suharto also made substantial changes in Indonesian forestry policy, and this
significantly facilitated the exploitation of Indonesia’s national resources by private
interests, and in many cases removed customary land from the Dayaks and leased it to
corporations. State control over natural resources was also tightened. These activities
were almost always legitimized in the name of national interest, as the government
claimed that they were necessary for Indonesia’s growth and development (Duile 2017).
Dayak identity and ethnic conflict
Today, West Kalimantan is one of the most ethnically diverse provinces of
Indonesia. The four ethnic groups in West Kalimantan are the Dayaks, the Kalimantese
Malays, the Chinese, and the Madurese. While numerically, the Madurese migrant
population has not been particularly significant, they have remained highly visible as they
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often established their communities geographically separate from the other ethnic groups
(Nooteboom 2010).
The Madurese have occupied an important role as another outgroup for the
Dayaks. Many Madurese were moved to West Kalimantan through Indonesia’s
transmigrasi program, whereby hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were moved from
overpopulated islands to outer, more rural areas of Indonesia in an attempt to redistribute
Indonesia’s growing population (Henley and Davidson 2013, 10). Originally, the
transmigrasi program was initiated by the Dutch colonial government, but by the end of
Dutch rule it had largely faded from existence. It was, however, revived under Soekarno
at the end of World War II, and ended two decades later.
Transmigrasi fueled both ethnic tensions and environmental issues. First, the
government grabbed land from the Dayaks and reassigned it to transmigrants, which led
to accusations by the Dayaks that the government was giving preferential treatment to the
migrants. There was also a widespread belief that the transmigrants were taking jobs from
local communities (Tanasaldy 1981). These ethnic tensions fed into violent conflicts
between the Dayaks and the Madurese in 1996 and 1997. Furthermore, the land that was
distributed to the transmigrants was often converted to monoculture crop plantations,
which were perceived as more modern compared to traditional Dayak methods of
farming (Duile 2017, 130). Because of this, anti-plantation protests started among the
Dayaks, although these remained rather small until NGOs later provided support.
Violent ethnic conflicts arose in December 1996 and January 1997 in the district
of Bengkayang. According to de Jonge and Nooteboom (2006), casualties numbered
between 500 and 1200, the majority of which were Madurese. In 1999, violence again
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erupted between the Malays and the Madurese, although the Dayaks quickly joined the
side of the Malays. There were again hundreds of casualties, and thousands of Madurese
were forced to flee to other islands (Peluso and Harwell 2001). The Madurese who did
not flee, either by choice or inability, were placed into government-sponsored refugee
camps. Violence again broke out in Sampit in Central Kalimantan, where again, hundreds
died, and almost the entire Madurese population of Sampit, numbering near 150,000
total, was evacuated to Madura and Java. In many places, in addition to the violence were
rumors of beheadings and cannibalism. Virtually all traces of the Madurese were wiped
out of these areas. In Sambas, the areas where the Madurese once lived, are nearly
indistinguishable, except for abandoned mosques and banana trees (De Jonge and
Nooteboom 2006).
The media attributed much of this violence to a regression to the old Dayak
cultural practices of headhunting. A Washington Post article wrote, “Almost all the
victims have been Madurese, and many of them were beheaded by the Dayaks, who are
descendants of a tribal group in Borneo known for practicing headhunting and
cannibalism until the late 19th century. Some of the dead also had their hearts cut out”
(Ch and Rasekaran 2001). Many Dayak accounts, however, cited that this violence was
not tied to headhunting, but instead, that ethnic groups throughout Indonesia, including
the Madurese, had used violent tactics in ethnic conflicts for decades (Nooteboom 2010).
Regardless, much of the public discourse surrounding these attacks supported a
preexisting stereotype of the Dayaks as primitive and violent. Even today, Borneo has
consistently been labeled the “Land of the Headhunters”, instead of the “Land of the
Dayaks,” which would of course be more accurate. Associating instances of violence
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with headhunting is also misleading; as described earlier, headhunting was a ritualistic
cultural rite, and not associated with war in the way that it was framed by the media
(Peluso and Harwell 2001).
These sorts of conflicts had an important impact on Dayak identity. Although
marginalization made some Dayaks ashamed of their identity, as resistance efforts against
the government grew, indigenous identity increasingly more and more a point of strength,
wherein greater unity emerged out of a common struggle. This is a pattern from which
many social movements have emerged, as ingroup identity becomes strengthened in the
presence of outgroups (Weisel and Böhm 2015).
Dayak empowerment in the 21st Century
Finally, decentralization since the fall of Suharto has greatly changed the political
climate of West Kalimantan. For one, regional governments have gained greater
autonomy, as education, labor, public works, and natural-resource management are now
under the purview of regional governments. These regional governments, furthermore,
are now allowed to generate their own revenue and receive a higher share of tax revenue
generated within their borders (McWilliam 2006, 56). While these adjustments took place
all over Indonesia, in Kalimantan their effects were particularly strong. This was, in large
part, because of the richness of the region’s natural resources. The areas of Kutai Timur,
Kutai Bara, and Berau, for example, have become some of the wealthiest districts in
Indonesia as a result (Asien et al. 2017, 15).
Dayak communities have benefited from increased regional autonomy in a variety
of ways. Their participation in governance has soared. Many districts in West Kalimantan
are majority Dayak, which has bolstered the election of Dayak politicians to office

25

26

(Tanasaldy 2012). Furthermore, hierarchical village structures that had been imposed
during the New Order were abolished, which allowed Dayak communities to return to
their customary village governance systems. Dayak communities, as a result of this
empowerment, have also begun to reconstruct their identity, and ethnic pride has
blossomed. One scholar noted, for example, upon arrival to East Kalimantan in 2016, the
abundance of diverse ethnic symbols throughout Samarinda, the region’s capital city. He
wrote, “wooden statues reminiscent of totem poles are installed adjacent to shopping
malls and names of indigenous groups (suku) and locales from Borneo are inscribed in
the urban environment through street and shop names” (Oesterheld 2016, 138). This is a
reversal from what many Dayak communities have experienced historically.
This represents a reversal from an unfortunate pattern of marginalization of the
Dayaks, which predated colonial rule under the Malay Sultanate. This new pride has
manifested itself in the outward expression of Dayak culture, and this is becoming
increasingly visible all over Kalimantan. Longhouses, for example, which were once
labeled dirty and associated with Communism, have been reclaimed and are now being
used by politicians as centers for Dayak events. Other cultural symbols, including
indigenous art, music, and dance, have also been repopularized (Ibid.).
This has also consisted of a reclamation of traditional systems of forest
management in Indonesia. Although indigenous groups in Indonesia in the past were
marginalized and labeled as backward and uneducated in part because of their close
relationship with the forest, they now have begun to reclaim their traditional management
practices, which have been legitimized by centuries of experience having lived on that
land. These arguments make sense; it is, further, in the best interest of communities that
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are some of the most reliant on forest resources to focus efforts on managing these
resources in a sustainable way, as it is fair to assume that these resources will continue to
be valuable to them in the future. Thus, by strategically utilizing popular perceptions
about the Dayaks being close to nature, activists have been able to use these to legitimize
claims to land tenure, where the Dayaks now occupy roles as keepers of traditional,
sustainable knowledge (Asien et al. 2017)
This phenomenon was coined a ‘Revival of Tradition’ by Henley and Davidson
(2013), who noted that decentralization was expected to bring alongside of it increased
commitments to human rights and the fostering of a more open civil society. What was
more unexpected, however, was that there was also a reconstruction of identity all over
Indonesia. A wide range of regional manifestations of these patterns exists, but they
likely share some common influences. A global indigenous peoples’ movement has given
rise to similar revivals of ethnic identity; perhaps part of this is due to a shift in thinking
of the political Left (Henley and Davidson 2013). That is, in recent decades the Left has
placed a greater emphasis on cultural diversity and ethnic identity in opposition to
constructions of nationalism or class. These arguments have been bolstered by an
increased interest in indigenous rights. The International Labor Organization’s
Convention 169, for example, recognized indigenous peoples’ right to a land base. More
recently, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People in 2007, which set minimum standards for member states to
meet in recognizing indigenous rights. Thus, one contribution to reconstructions of
Dayak identity has been increased pride, which has flourished as part of a broader,
international trend in the proliferation of human rights doctrines.
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Chapter Three: Forestry, adat law, and the Indonesian state
Adat law and the Dayaks
As discussed previously, knowledge of traditional forestry practices may aid in
legitimizing Dayak claims to user rights. Because of this, an understanding of Dayak
forest management systems is important. As mentioned in Chapter 2, adat, or customary
law, governs these traditional forest management systems. In fact, adat law prescribes the
protocols that govern many aspects of decision-making in Dayak life, and is particularly
salient in managing forest use. Unfortunately, Indonesian national law and customary law
often are incompatible with one another. Thus, a tension exists where the Dayaks face
pressure to maintain adat law, yet must also adhere to state law when it is required.
Historically, the state’s observance and protection of customary law has remained
rather weak in Indonesia. In the case of any inconsistencies between adat law and state
law, state law prevails (Butt 2014). As a result, legally, adat law can only truly be
enforced where gaps exist in state law. Furthermore, Indonesian state law has tended to
be Western in nature, which in some cases is incompatible with adat law. One example is
the Western concept of the “right of ownership”, under which land is registered and may
be mortgaged. By contrast, under adat law, most land is communally held and controlled
by the village head (Butt 2014, 66). Further, many indigenous communities prefer to live
under the traditions of adat law, rather than national law, and will do so when they are
able (Rahardjo 2016). For example, many Dayak civil and criminal cases are settled by
village heads or adat heads and thus never see the Indonesian court system (Liu, Faure,
and Mascini 2018, 58).
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Adat institutions are also crucial to the maintenance of Dayak forest resources
because they govern the behavior of communities and their relationships with the
physical environment (van Ast, Widaryati, and Bal 2014). Adat law distinguishes
between two types of land ownership: community owned land (tanah milik kelompok),
which usually is cleared by groups and might contain shared resources like fruit trees,
and individually owned land (tanah milik perorangan) (Szczepanski 2002). Usually, an
individual or family will cut down trees in a plot of land, burn the brush and debris that
remain, and then use the ash to fertilize the soil, which, like in many forested areas
globally, is nutritionally quite poor. Afterward, they cultivate the land, often for two or
three crop cycles, and then the land is left fallow for another period, usually ranging
between 10 or 15 years.
Through adat law, an association between swidden agriculture and what
Westerners might call the “supernatural” exists as well, perhaps as a means to address the
looming uncertainties with which swidden agrarian societies must cope. More
specifically, Dayaks face issues like infertility of forest soils, insecure supply of resources
like water, and abundance of pests. Thus, one component of adat is a belief that humans
may communicate with the spiritual world to ensure that natural forces will act in their
benefit (Thomson 2000, 54). Thus, the relationship between swidden agriculture and adat
law is quite close.
Adat also governs the distribution of forest products among community members.
These systems often are quite complex and involve a number of overlapping user-rights
claims. For example, villages once consisted of several longhouses, in which many
families lived communally. One longhouse might have held up to 60 apartments (Peluso
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1993). Now, however, most villages consist of clusters of single-family homes, which
share community-owned land as well as forest products from that land. In some cases,
other villages or groups of outsiders pay a “tax” to the village to gain access to resources
of the common property. Usually this consists of an in-kind contribution of 20 percent of
whatever resources were harvested, although today, cash transactions also are common
(Ibid.). Some forest products, regardless of whether they have been grown on community
or privately-owned land, are common property of the village. For example, any
community member may harvest mushrooms or bamboo shoots, even if they grow in a
privately owned garden. These, again, are protected by legal systems that have been
established under adat law.
Further, if a villager wishes to plant on an unused swidden area that had
previously been occupied by another villager, the first villager must obtain permission
from his or her predecessor and the local adat authorities (McCarthy 2000, 108). These
authorities usually consist of a community adat leader, who arbitrates conflict with
respect to adat law, as well as an adat council, which enforces adat norms and rules.
Councilmembers are usually appointed based on reputation and knowledge of adat
(UNFAO n.d.). Thus, adat not only oversees the spiritual relationship between the human
and the natural world, but also more practical arrangements of land inheritance, transfer,
and management of collective properties. Again, many Dayaks see adat law as a central
component of their cultural identity (Thomson 2000). Many also perceive the forest to be
a very important source of cultural and spiritual benefits (Meijaard et al. 2013, 6)
The Indonesian State and its forestry
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Indonesian forests are generally extremely diverse, and are concentrated mainly
on four islands: Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Land use change has been a
serious issue in Kalimantan, where some of the primary threats forests are illegal logging,
land conversion to oil palm plantations, and forest fires (Rosenbarger 2009). Further, the
abundance of dipterocarpaceae, a family of hardwood trees, is especially valuable to
loggers. More generally, the Indonesian State has classified all forest into three
categories: production forest, protection forest, and conservation forest. Of these,
production forests are the largest, and make up 66 percent of all forest (Sardjono and
Imang 2015).
Historically, the extraction of forest products has been a crucial source of revenue
for Indonesia. Much of this revenue was generated from the sale of concessions to
commercial logging companies in production forests (Sardjono and Imang 2015). For
example, Suharto’s regime aimed for a stabilization strategy that underpinned the harvest
and export of logs, which led to the investment of capital from large transnational
corporations from the United States and Japan. By the 1970s, the forestry sector had
become the second largest source of profit for the Indonesian government, after the oil
sector (Hidayat 2015). It is important to note, further, that the oil sector has also been
inextricably linked to deforestation; much of Indonesia’s oil is stored in its forested areas.
The exploitation of both of these sectors, then, has led to rapid deforestation.
Because of this, local communities have suffered, as their livelihoods rely on
these depleting resources. These communities also have faced challenges of adaptation to
changing government policies and environments despite having lived there for, in some
cases, centuries. Additionally, for decades, shifting cultivators were accused of
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environmental harm and the destruction of forests (Dove 1983). These shifting
cultivators, along with landless migrant farmers, were often labeled the primary causes of
deforestation in Indonesia (Soedjito 2015, 420). However, it has now been increasingly
accepted that shifting cultivation can actually be quite sustainable. Further, the
deforestation caused by shifting cultivation has been small in comparison to the
deforestation related to corporate activity, like the felling of logs by timber companies
(Angelsen 1995, 1713). Currently, shifting cultivators tend to hold more negative
perceptions about the impacts of large-scale land clearing than do other groups (Meijaard
et al. 2013, 6).
Historically, the Dutch imposed the first formal, top-down forest governance
system in Indonesia, although adat law was still practiced on the outer islands under
Dutch rule (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 33). Since independence, the Indonesian
government declared all forest under its authority, and thus is the primary actor
responsible for its management and governance (Chipeta and Durst 2010). This has been
asserted by the Indonesian Constitution, which gives the state the right to “control” its
natural resources, and was later reaffirmed in the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) and
the 1976 Basic Forestry Law (BFL), both of which served to further tighten the state’s
grasp on natural resources (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 34). The 1976 BFL prohibited
communal or private ownership of forest resources, which then allowed the state to grant
forest concessions and then profit off of these concessions. Local communities suffered,
as the state’s claims to forested areas often overlapped with their traditional land (Vargas
1985). Furthermore, the state exaggerated the percentage of forest cover in certain areas
in order to meet the baseline for the “forested area” designation and to ensure its
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authority there accordingly (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 34). Both the BAL and the
BFL, along with other relevant legislation, will be reviewed in Chapter 4.
The Dayaks may register their land under the Indonesian state, which would
confirm user rights for subsistence farming, but it is often prohibitively expensive and the
application process is extensive and complex (Szczepanski 2002, 237). In the 1980s,
conflict existed between the national government and the provincial government, as the
national government stated that the right of land ownership should be granted to shifting
cultivators, while the provincial government disagreed (Vargas 1985, 250). Although
decentralization has brought numerous benefits for local communities, it has also
worsened ambiguity in the law, complicated by disagreements among national,
provincial, and local governments. The government’s failure to acknowledge swidden
agricultural practices, which leaves lands fallow for years at a time, has also caused
problems. The national government has, in some cases, declared fallow land as
“abandoned”, even though the Dayaks likely would have later returned to it (Szczepanski
2002). Because of this, it is much easier for the government to confiscate land at will, as
officially it often is untitled and unregistered.
However, as the process of decentralization has continued, the government has
relinquished some of its authority over forestry. On one hand, decentralization has
created the opportunity for the involvement of local actors. On the other, decentralization
of forestry may have actually led to increased deforestation by district governments,
which later caused the Ministry of Forestry to reclaim some of its initial authority in the
years following 1999 (Hohne et al. 2018, 220). Like the national government, provincial
and local governments have also faced corruption and enforcement issues in the
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distribution of land titles, even though decentralization was expected to address these
problems, which had long afflicted management at the national level. This emphasizes
the need for greater community involvement, where accountability and transparency
would, in theory, increase, as local populations expand their role in the management of
resources.
Yet, simultaneously, the expansion of the forestry sector has improved the lives of
many; it has resulted in huge economic growth, poverty eradication, and created many
jobs. These trends continued following the 1970s. During the so-called “golden age” of
forestry, forestry exports in the 1980s hovered around US $200 million per year, but by
the 1990s had jumped up to US $2 billion per year (Sardjono and Imang 2015).
During the Reformation Era, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, decentralization
allowed for heightened participation of local communities in the forestry sector. And, this
has been a platform upon which organizations like the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Center for International Forestry Research
(CIFOR) have been able to encourage good governance in the realm of forest resource
management. Significant progress has indeed been made. For example, criteria for
sustainable forest management have been created, the divide between environmental and
poverty reduction organizations has lessened, and conversations surrounding forestry
policy have increasingly involved multiple stakeholders, which has led to more
transparency and accountability (Hidayat 2015).
However, the forestry sector, and more specifically, the Ministry of Forestry, has
been notorious for corruption and mismanagement. Part of this arose from Suharto’s
centralization of natural resource industries, which reduced transparency and allowed
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government officials to exploit their authority for their own personal benefit. For
example, in 2000, Bob Hasan, a former Minister of Trade and Industry in Suharto’s
government, was tried for causing losses of around USD $75 million to the state and
USD $168 million to the Indonesian Association of Forest Concessionaires (APHI) (BBC
News 2000). Even today, corruption in the forestry sector is rampant. A huge source of
revenue, near USD $15 billion per year in 2012, was a product of the sale of forestry
permits that allow logging and other forms of forest resource extraction (Bachelard
2012). One problem, then, has been the existence of a system of concessions awards
dependent upon bribery of forest officials.
Regardless, balancing conservation and development is difficult, as mentioned
earlier. Historically, development in Indonesia has sometimes been antithetical to
conservation. The country’s heavy reliance on natural resource exploitation, including on
forest products and hydrocarbons, has meant that development often necessitated
deforestation. And a shift in the past decade to heightened sustainability has in some
ways intensified this conflict. Reducing carbon emissions, for one, hampers some of
Indonesia’s most profitable industries. However, the government also has recognized that
Indonesia will likely feel the effects of climate change intensely in the future. Climate
change may lead to extremely costly trends of decreased rainfall, increased flood risk,
and rising sea levels. One study found that the economic cost of droughts and fire in
Indonesia in 1997-1998 was about USD $9 billion (Applegate et al. 2002).
These issues are likely to worsen in the future as the climate change problem
intensifies. Thus, the Indonesian state has a clear incentive to push for more effective
sustainable practices, although it faces the challenge of balancing these against more
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immediate economic development interests. Furthermore, Indonesia’s state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) are present in a variety of these industries, including in agriculture,
mining, and energy, and as such, the Indonesian government itself directly profits from
forest resource exploitation (Rosenbarger 2009). And, an estimated of 60 to 80 percent of
Indonesia’s carbon emissions are a result of deforestation (Bachelard 2012). Regardless,
these challenges have created opportunity for the Dayaks to assert themselves as keepers
of traditional, sustainable knowledge. Efforts to better incorporate local communities into
sustainable development have increased in Indonesia. This may help strengthen
arguments for indigenous land ownership.
Social forestry and common pool resource management
One way that local communities have been incorporated into sustainable
development efforts has been through social forestry programs. In more recent years, a
growing global movement has increased the involvement of indigenous or local
communities in sustainable resource management programs. These programs may help
address some of the challenges that governments have faced in managing the resources
on their own.
While a changing political and economic environment in Indonesia has
contributed to improving wellbeing nationally, the Dayaks continue to lag behind by
some measures. Ethnic differences in economic activity have been one contributor.
According to Nooteboom (2010), in Kalimantan, the Javanese tend to farm in
transmigrasi-established areas, or work in the better-paid jobs of the service sector and
the public sector. The Chinese own most of the shops in some areas of Kalimantan, and
dominate the retail and supply sectors. Many of the Madurese are quite poor, and work in
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strenuous physical labor, such as construction, garbage collection, and brickmaking,
although some have opened businesses like repair shops and sate (grilled meat) stands.
The Dayaks generally live relatively far away from towns.
Further, in Indonesia, rural people dependent on state forests tend to be poor
(Sunderlin, Dewi, and Puntodewo 2007, 32). A close correlation between high forest
cover and poverty also exists throughout most of Indonesia, although with some
variation. In Kalimantan, high forest cover actually is correlated with a relatively low
poverty rate (Ibid, 16). The reasons for this are unclear, although it could be that
increased economic activity from natural resource extraction has helped lessen poverty in
some areas. Another possibility is the positive impact of forest dwellers’ direct access to
forest resources. According to Pambduhi, Belcher, and Dewi (2007), “Higher levels of
forest resources and suitable land for agroforestry are also associated with higher welfare.
Relatively remote, well endowed forest villages with limited economic alternatives show
a high well-being relative to other villages in the area being studied.” (1431) It was also
noted, though, that generally the majority of local people in their study area lacked access
to forest resources and because of this were highly disadvantaged. This affirms the
importance of securing access to forest resources for local communities.
In Indonesia, the first social forestry programs were incorporated into national
policy during the 1980s, but they faced challenges of navigating complicated and
conflicting legislation that inhibited successful implementation. In 1995, the Ministry of
Forestry introduced programs with a CBFM focus for the first time in Indonesia, under
Ministerial Decree No. 622 of 1995 (Purnomo and Anand 2014, 29). The primary
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purpose of the policy was to improve degraded forests and increase community
participation, although the policy has since been altered multiple times.
Since then, one criticism has been that the state-imposed social forestry programs
have remained top-down in nature and conflict with unofficial community systems that
had already been established for decades (Rosenbarger 2009). On the other hand,
government involvement may also be important in ensuring the recognition of rights,
facilitating conflict resolution, and providing technical support. Regardless, the changing
political landscape in Indonesia has created opportunity for the Dayaks to manage their
resources locally, partly because of political decentralization. Thus, for the Dayaks, one
important question will be where the balance between government intervention and
community autonomy exists.
It is be useful first to examine some factors that have fed into the success of
common pool resource management more generally. Elinor Ostrom (1999) has laid out
eight design principles that central to long-enduring common-pool resources institutions:
1.

The resource should have clearly defined boundaries. The individuals
and households who retain the rights to withdraw resources and the
boundaries of that resource itself must be clear.

2.

Congruence should exist to ensure that the rules that assign benefits
and the rules assign costs are fair. Participants must perceive these
rules as fair as well.

3.

Users should be involved in collective choice arrangements that can
modify operational rules governing the extraction of the resource. If a
group of users perceive the system as unfair, it is important that
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mechanisms to address their grievances exist, otherwise they may
begin to cheat, and enforcement costs may rise.
4.

Monitoring is important to maintain accountability. Often the monitors
are users themselves.

5.

Graduated sanctions should exist for users who violate operational
rules that limit their participation in the institution.

6.

Users should have access to low-cost, effective conflict-resolution
mechanisms.

7.

Government authorities should not challenge the rights of users to
form institutions.

8.

For common-pool resources that are part of larger systems, the above
principles should be nested so that externalities may be addressed in a
broader, cohesive organizational setting.

It is important to note that social forestry programs vary substantially, and so must
the implementation of these principles. Nonetheless, they are useful broad guidelines for
understanding factors that have been demonstrated to be central to successful social
forestry programs. For the Dayaks, many of these principles have not yet been met.
Ostrom’s principles that have had particular effect on the Dayaks will be discussed
below.
With respect to Design Principles 1, Chapter Four will discuss ambiguities in
Indonesian law that lead to a lack of clearly defined boundaries. Even in instances where
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these boundaries have been clearly defined, further, in some cases communities have
continued to see their land rights violated.
Furthermore, increasing the involvement of local communities benefits not only
the communities themselves, but may also help address some of the challenges the
government has faced surrounding the monitoring and enforcement of forestry policy.
This would help address Design Principles 3 and 4. For one, forests in Indonesia can be
large and scattered, and in areas where forest cover percentage is high, protecting forest
borders from outside users can be costly. Forests are particularly scattered in West
Kalimantan, compared to the rest of Borneo (Meijaard et al. 2013, 3). When communities
are allowed to use the forests, they have an incentive to engage in enforcement against
outside users. Conversely, if communities are not allowed to use the forests, they are less
likely to report violators, as they could face legal repercussions themselves (Robinson et
al. 2012). Legal community involvement also protects biodiversity; by defining the
groups with legal access to forest resources, overexploitation of these resources becomes
less of an issue, first, because local communities become more likely to enforce this
exclusivity, and second, because there are fewer groups of people extracting these
resources in the first place.
Another problem is a lack of government support, which likely hampers
legitimacy, conflict-resolution, and training. This leads to issues described by Design
Principle 7, in which the state might also be overly heavy-handed and therefore risks
infringing upon the authority of local communities when it is unnecessary to do so.
Increasing the involvement of capacity-building organizations might be beneficial in
providing support where the government has been lacking, ensuring fairness in
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community involvement in decision-making, and bringing issues to the agenda as needed.
However, stronger networks among groups are needed. For example, Alianzi Masyarakat
Adat Nusantara (AMAN) (Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) is the
primary organization representing the interests of indigenous communities. According to
their website, they represent 2,366 communities with a total population of over 18 million
(AMAN n.d.). While their main focuses are land reform and the recognition of
community rights to self-governance, forestry and land tenure are other key issues.
Because of its broad focus, however, AMAN has found itself stretched rather thin and
thus, in the realm of forestry, has mainly focused on raising attention to issues
(Colchester 2002, 23). More focused capacity-building organizations, working with
AMAN, could be beneficial.
It is also important to note, though, that the Indonesian government has indeed
made significant efforts toward more effective community forestry. On one hand,
decentralization was expected to increase the sustainability of forest management by
more effectively incorporating local communities. Yet, its effects instead have
contributed to mass exploitation of forest resources by regional governments, as this is
often the fastest and easiest way to develop their economies and increase their income
(Sardjono and Imang 2015).
With respect to Design Principle 7, the main reason why governments take
control of forestry is due to concern that, without government regulation, resources will
be over-used and will become depleted. This is the tragedy of the commons. After
decentralization, while regional governments may have had the best interests of
conservation in mind, the implications of an approach that excludes local people from

41

42

forest use is neither fair nor practical. The hope is that community involvement would
help address some of the challenges that the government has faced when using a topdown approach.
The increased opportunity for social forestry was borne, at least partly, out of
decentralization. In theory, encouraging community participation in decision-making
processes would better support options that benefit local communities. This might
include, for example, improved recognition of indigenous rights as well as heightened
utilization of traditional forest management practices. Decentralization has also increased
the pressure for local elected officials to pay attention to the wants and needs of
constituents. Better transparency has the potential to decrease corruption. The
government would likely also benefit from increasing its own transparency and
accountability. For one, the national government has lost significant revenue from the
exploitation of forest resources in the logging industry due to corruption and tax evasion
(Human Rights Watch 2009).
Awareness of forestry programs presents another issue. Many communities in
Kalimantan, particularly those located in forests, may lack information on how to
participate in social forestry programs. Forestry and its related laws in Indonesia are
constantly changing, so it can be difficult for communities to keep up. This can challenge
Ostrom’s Design Principles at all levels. Without knowledge of the rules, or how to
participate in these programs in the first place, it is of course not possible to have longenduring common resource management systems. State-sponsored educational programs
might help mitigate this issue. Furthermore, in order to encourage communities to
consider forestry as a long-term project, states should make the permit application more
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flexible, extend permit periods, and make renewals easier. This might help address some
concerns that decentralization feeds into decision-making focused only on the short-term.
Further, the current system is unclear, and permits may be subject to revocation if they
are perceived to conflict with state interests (Rosenbarger 2009). A more comprehensive
set of recommendations will be elaborated upon at the conclusion of this thesis.
Still, real concerns about increasing community involvement exist. For one, some
worry that local groups might lack long-term perspective and fail to see greater potential
consequences of some decisions. Further, the rapid decentralization that Indonesia
underwent has meant that local governments are often unequipped to handle their new
responsibilities (White and Smoke 2005). As mentioned before, one example of this was
widespread corruption surrounding forestry concessions by provincial governments after
decentralization. So, another issue is government support. The government faces the
challenge of promoting community involvement by providing technical support and
training, while also allowing enough freedom for communities to have real decisionmaking powers.
Forestry and the International Community
It is also important to note that many forest products serve as public goods, not
just for Indonesia, but for the international community as well. Forests are critical to
protecting biodiversity and carbon sequestration, both with global repercussions. The
increasing threat of climate change has brought these issues to the forefront of the
international agenda. Carbon sequestration is especially relevant now, with the
establishment of carbon credit programs under the United Nations Programme on
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD+)(Bayrak,
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Mustafa, and Marafa 2016). However, efforts to lower forest carbon emissions have not
impacted all stakeholders equally. UN-REDD+, in particular, has raised concerns
regarding the extent to which local communities will be included in land and natural
resources use. UN-REDD+ incentivizes countries to use forest carbon emissions as a
standard to measure a country’s performance, and thus how much financial reward it
should receive (Astuti and Mcgregor 2015).
In theory, UN-REDD+ could promote poverty alleviation if it improves local
participation in forest governance, and if funds from carbon credits are distributed to
local communities. However, it could also threaten local communities, if, for example, it
prevented them from using forest resources for subsistence (Bayrak, Mustafa, and Marafa
2016). Again, a tendency exists for the government to maintain its control, and
motivating it to reduce carbon emissions may also encourage it to insulate the forest from
development all together.
To protect local communities, UN-REDD+ has implemented safeguards, such as
its guidelines on Free Prior and Informed Consent, to help ensure transparency and
increased community participation. However, when governments do not recognize
indigenous rights to start, these safeguards lack impact. In Indonesia, one issue has been
that land tenure agreements are often unclear and poorly enforced, so Free Prior and
Informed Consent guidelines are then largely symbolic (Bayrak, Mustafa, and Marafa
2016). Capacity-building programs have been established to help empower local
stakeholders and to ensure their benefit from UNREDD+, with limited success.
Communities in Indonesia have lacked technical knowledge and skills as well as
the organizing skills required for effective collaborative planning (Larrabure and
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Moeliono 2013). Thus, one challenge for the Dayaks will be how to navigate these
systems and establish leadership that can adequately organize communities and
communicate with outside groups. Furthermore, even after community forestry programs
have been implemented, monitoring and enforcement represent significant issues.
Funding is limited, and government spending on the environment decreased throughout
the 1990s and 2000s (Aden et al. 2001). While since then, the budget allocation for
environmental planning has increased, the World Bank has noted that Indonesia’s
macroeconomic policies continue to disfavor environmental sustainability, as they reward
revenue rather than stewardship (Wingqvist and Dahlberg 2008). Lack of infrastructure
needed to access forests, like roads and trails, also make enforcement issues problematic.
Capacity-building organizations will probably play an important role in providing
technical support and expertise. And, as discussed previously, increased community
involvement may help mitigate some of the issues surrounding monitoring and
enforcement.
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Chapter Four: Indonesian Law and Adat Communities
As discussed earlier, one serious challenge for the Indonesian government has
been the question of how to address regulating access to forest resources. The
government must balance a wide range of interests, including those of adat communities,
corporations, and conservation advocates. While these are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, they have often been at odds with one another. Legislation aimed at addressing
these issues has been passed, although problems of ambiguity harm invocation of the law
and can lead to corruption and mismanagement.
These problems have a direct impact on adat communities, whose livelihood
strategies often rely on availability of and access to forest resources. This chapter will
discuss legislation affecting these communities, but it is first important to understand how
the Indonesian state defines indigeneity, as this is of course fundamental to understanding
the law. However, currently, different terms are used to refer to indigenous people.
According to a report by AMAN, an organization which represents interests of
indigenous Indonesians, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Environment
and Forestry have identified some groups as “geographically isolated communities”
(komunitas adat terpencil), while other government legislation instead uses the term
“customary law societies”, or “customary law communities”, (masyarakat hukum) a
colonial term (Coalition for Enforcement of Law 2017). Using the term “geographically
isolated communities” has been understood by some to refer to areas where it has been
more difficult to impose an image of national unity (Duile 2017). The term “indigenous
peoples” (masyarakat adat) is the term that has been frequently promoted by indigenous
peoples’ networks and NGOs; AMAN itself stands for Aliansi Masyarakat Adat
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Nusantara (Indigenous People’s Alliance of the Archipelago). In addition to these,
however, other groups claiming indigeneity exist, outside of those identified by the
government as indigenous.
Even among the international community, some ambiguity exists surrounding
how indigenous groups should be defined. The 2013 United Nations Manual for National
Human Rights Institutions, for example, even notes that there is no universally agreed
upon definition for indigeneity. One factor is the concern that adopting a formal
definition at the international level removes flexibility and, instead, communities should
be allowed to define their indigeneity as they see fit. This, however, creates challenges
for countries like Indonesia, where there has long been conflict over how to define
indigeneity. In some instances, groups might have an interest in labeling themselves
indigenous, if, for example, indigenous groups gain exclusive access to particular
resources. Thus, reason exists to restrict the definition of indigeneity; indigeneity as
grounds for special rights loses meaning if outside groups manage to exploit this. At the
same time, though, retaining flexibility is also important, as it recognizes and protects the
diversity of indigenous groups within Indonesia.
Thus, defining indigeneity has been an issue within groups claiming customary
land rights in Kalimantan. In the context of Indonesia, indigenous groups often have been
mobile, which complicates definitions of indigeneity that emphasize historical ties to a
particular tract of land. For example, in Malinau, in East Kalimantan, the Merap, an
indigenous group with historical claims to the area, differentiate themselves and the
Kenyah, another Kalimantese indigenous group, by labeling themselves orang asli
(indigenous or original person) and the Kenyah pendatang (migrant or
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newcomer)(Wollenberg, Moeliono, and Limberg 2009). That is, although the Kenyah are
indeed Dayak, and are, like the Merap, indigenous Kalimantese, they are nonetheless
referred to as non-indigenous, because of their relatively new arrival to a given area.
Thus, while to an outsider, the Merap and the Kenyah might appear equally indigenous,
that is not always how it is perceived within indigenous groups. Further, for the Kenyah,
who migrated to Malinau in the 1960s and 1970s, their classification as migrants is
significant, as it could threaten their claims to land. The Merap, who are far fewer in
number, occupy large tracts of land within Malinau based on historical claims, even
though the Kenyah are indigenous to East Kalimantan as well (Ibid.)
In addition to indigeneity, other issues of ambiguity in the law also impact natural
resource management and conservation. One example surrounds the issue of
deforestation. On one hand, in some cases, activities leading to deforestation are legal,
and even actively encouraged by the state. This might include, for example, drilling to
access oil reserves. In 2018, the government cut several regulations in an effort to
increase investment in oil and gas, which had been declining (Yuniarni 2018). In other
cases, deforestation might be illegal, though facilitated by state officials, such as when
logging permits are distributed corruptly (Bachelard 2012).
And, as mentioned in the previous chapter, natural resource extraction is a
significant contributor to Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP). In 2017,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed to around 13 percent of the nation’s GDP.
While these figures have declined significantly from previous decades (in 1986,
agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed as much as 24.3 percent), natural resources
continue to play a substantial role in Indonesia’s national economy (World Bank 2017).
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Yet, conservation and indigenous communities represent other interests against
which the Indonesian government must balance these revenue sources. Thus, in one
scenario, where deforestation is a consequence of legal activities, one strategy might be
to encourage the Indonesian government to pass regulatory legislation. Initiatives like
UNREDD+ have attempted to achieve this, with some success, by creating incentives for
governments to reduce carbon emissions. Indonesia has passed some legislation that
outlines mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions with UNREDD+ support (The
REDD Desk 2015). In another scenario, however, where deforestation occurs illegally,
and the Indonesian government is either complicit or is simply unable to effectively
monitor and enforce the law, increasing local community involvement has great potential.
And, Indonesian law is critical here.
As has been emphasized throughout this thesis, recognizing forest access and
ownership for indigenous communities like the Dayaks decreases corruption from
government officials; increased community participation encourages transparency in
political processes. Further, it can motivate local groups to monitor and enforce land use
protections from encroachers. This chapter, then, will review, first, Indonesian legislation
affecting adat communities, and second, how this legislation, alongside government
programs, forms a changing legal environment that adat communities have been required
to navigate. Lastly, case studies demonstrating some of the challenges in implementing
this legislation will be discussed.
Legislation affecting adat communities
The Indonesian Constitution
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As mentioned previously, the existence of adat communities was first recognized
in the 1945 Constitution, which contains two articles that directly impact indigenous
communities.
The first of these is Article 18B(2), which states that the government must respect adat
customary land rights:
The State shall recognize and respect, to be regulated by law, the homogeneity of
societies with customary law along with their traditional rights for as long as they
remain in existence and in agreement with societal development and with the
principle of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.
While this is significant, one issue is that the Constitution avoids the term adat
community (masyarakat adat) which conveys a connotation of autonomy compared to
the term traditional community (masyarakat tradisional) (Bedner and Huis 2008, 170).
An important question is, if a community is perceived by the government to no longer be
“traditional,” whether or not it retains its “traditional rights”. These rights themselves are
also unspecific, and the Constitution fails to clarify exactly what rights they encompass.
Further, the stipulation that adat law must not interfere with the law of the State fails to
protect adat communities in a meaningful way. Limiting indigenous protections by
requiring that they do not hinder state interests is a consistently used strategy, as will be
illustrated in later legislation. Former President Suharto later claimed that all Indonesians
are equally indigenous, which effectively removed any special status from adat
communities (Li 2000, 149). The 1945 Constitution’s insufficient protections for adat
communities likely played a role.
Basic Agrarian Law and Basic Forestry Law
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Restriction of property rights is one method that the Indonesian government has
used to confront problems of deforestation. As mentioned in previous chapters, public,
private and community forests exist in Indonesia, although ambiguity surrounding how
these are defined has led to conflicts between users. The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law and
the 1967 Basic Forestry Law together comprise the primary pieces of legislation
governing natural resources, and thus impact the access of adat communities to these
resources.
The Basic Agrarian Law in particular has had an immense impact on the
regulations of traditional land rights for indigenous communities. To start, at its surface,
the Basic Agrarian Law appears to protect adat rights in a meaningful way, stating that is
necessary that “a National Agrarian law is established, based upon the Adat-law,” and,
later, in Article 5, that “the Agrarian law which applied to the earth, water and air space
Is Adat-Law…” (Act No. 5 of 1960 Concerning Basic Regulations on Agrarian
Principles 1960). However, Bedner and Huis argue that the Basic Agrarian Law redefines
adat law from its common usage, and instead, means “the original law of a group of
Native Indonesians (2008, 178). Thus, it longer acknowledges the wide variety of adat
laws in Indonesia. The state’s failure to recognize the diverse set of interests among adat
communities presents significant challenges to communities interested in claiming
customary rights. According to a 1990 Environesia publication, the government later
remarked that “in reality adat laws are so diverse and widespread that [it] is nearly
impossible to adequately incorporate all adat principles into a national law…” (as cited in
Rossabi 1999, 35).
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Furthermore, similar to the Constitution, the Basic Agrarian Law, in Article 5,
goes on to state that adat law must not conflict with the “National and State’s interests
based on the unity of the Nation, With Indonesian Socialism as well as with the
regulation stipulated in this Act and with other legislative regulations…” Despite the
allusion to Communism, however, the Basic Agrarian Law was also, for the most part,
based upon individual notions of land ownership, and often failed to recognize communal
or collective land tenure, which then severely limited the traditional adat systems of
community land tenure (McWilliam 2006).
Thus, as discussed previously, national and state interests retain priority over the
customary rights of indigenous communities. Finally, in Article 9(2), the law requires
that all Indonesians must have equal opportunity to acquire land, which then prohibits
indigenous communities from obtaining any special rights, as well as from establishing
their own laws regulating use on adat land (Bedner and Huis 2008, 179) .
The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 built upon the Basic Agrarian Law, although it
contained even fewer protections for indigenous communities. Part of this was probably
due to its passage under the New Order, led by Suharto, who was particularly hostile to
adat rights. The Basic Forestry Law required that adat lands be classified as state forest,
and not private forest, which forced adat communities, now living on state forest, to
follow national forestry policy (Act No. 5 of 1967 Concerning Basic Provisions of
Forestry 1967). As a result, adat communities lost their rights to till land within the
forest, and instead retained only the rights to collect forest products (Bedner and Huis
2008, 182). In some cases, adat communities could not adequately support themselves
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and were forced to move to other areas. Many of these communities left with neither
compensation nor recognition of their customary claims (McWilliam 2006).
The Basic Forestry Law also continued to severely weaken communal rights for
indigenous communities, and made cases where adat laws was implemented in a manner
that, in its own language, “disturb[ed] the goals stipulated in this law” illegal. This
referred, in some cases, to perceived interference with national interests in conservation
and production, but in others, it referred to communities using their rights to obstruct the
construction of development projects, including “large-scale forest clearance for large
projects, or in the interests of transmigration, and so on.” Again, this demonstrates the
damage that the Basic Forestry Law caused to the rights of indigenous communities.
However, since the fall of the New Order government, the changing political system in
Indonesia has fostered democratization and decentralization.
However, the speed with which this has occurred has created significant impacts
on indigenous communities, both positive and negative. Thus, this chapter will continue
to explore more recent legislation concerning the recognition of human rights,
decentralization, and reclassification of indigenous land. Partly as a result of these
policies, labeled reformasi (reformation), Indonesia has experience a flourishing of
identity politics.
Act No. 39 of 1999 Concerning Human Rights
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, adat communities were once again
recognized in national legislation. Act No. 39, in Article 6, states:
The differences and needs of indigenous peoples must be taken into consideration
and protected by law, the public, and the Government. The cultural identity of
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indigenous peoples, including indigenous land rights, must be upheld, in
accordance with the development of the times.
The acknowledgement of indigenous land rights is important. Later in the Act, in
Articles 36 and 37, rights to own property, and freedom from arbitrary or unlawful
seizure are also guaranteed, along with a requirement that “the right to ownership of a
property in the public interest shall not be revoked, except with the restoration of fair,
proper and adequate compensation, based on prevailing legislation.” While the rights to
ownership indeed are significant, one issue is that indigenous groups often are not
granted ownership, and instead, are granted only use rights.
As a 2002 report from the Asia Development Bank noted, Articles 6, 36, and 37
together are relevant in the protection of adat land rights, as they require that any seizure
of adat land must be done through fair, legitimate means, where adat communities have
given free and prior informed consent (Asia Development Bank 2002). In practice,
however, this has not been the case.
Act No. 22 of 1999 Concerning Local Government and Act No. 32 of 2004 Concerning
Regional Administration
Changes in governance structure resulting from decentralization have had
substantial impacts on the management of Indonesia’s forests. Immediately following
Suharto’s regime, a series of laws were passed, which shifted power from the central
government to district governments and municipalities (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018).
Post-Suharto, the Indonesian government has adopted two pieces of legislation on
regional autonomy: Act No. 22 of 1999 Concerning Local Government and Act No. 32 of
2004 Concerning Regional Administration.

54

55

These replaced the existing Act No. 5 of 1979, which reduced, and in some cases,
eliminated, the autonomy of adat institutions. Under Act No. 5 of 1979, new governance
structures, based on Javanese village models, had been introduced, and adat institutions
were incorporated into these new structures, which had severely limited their decisionmaking power, and required that all decisions be subject to district head approval (Bedner
and Huis 2008, 172). The traditional adat leaders were excluded from natural resource
management in particular, and instead, their responsibilities were reduced to facilitating
adat ceremonies. (Asia Development Bank 2002).
Act No. 22 of 1999 reformed the village governance structure that had been
imposed under Act No. 5 of 1979. It allowed traditional forms of village government to
be re-installed, and also encouraged democracy at the local level (Bedner and Huis 2008,
172). Its preface states:
Law No. 5/1979 on regional administrations (Statute Book No. 56/1979,
Supplement to Statute Book No. 3153), which brings uniformity in the name,
form, structure and position of village administrations, is no longer compatible
with the spirit of the Constitution of 1945 and the need to recognize and honor the
right of regional origin, which is special in nature, so that it must be replaced.
Act No. 22 of 1999 thus removed the hierarchy among local, district, and
provincial governments that had been imposed by the central government. In other words,
local district heads were no longer required to report to the governor regarding local-level
decisions. The Act also granted local governments increased financial responsibility for
infrastructure and personnel, including for schools and roads. However, conflicting
interpretations on two Articles within the Act have led to disagreements between local
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officials and the Ministry of Forestry (Rosenbarger 2009, 19). Article 8 stipulates the
central government retains the authority to regulate issues of natural resource
management, while Article 10 requires local governments to retain responsibility for
protecting natural resources.
Act No. 32 of 2004 builds upon Act No. 22 of 1999, and in Article 12, it further
acknowledges the importance of local culture and tradition in establishing local
governance systems:
Village or the like means a unity of constitutional community which has borders
and the authority to govern and manage the interest of the local people based
on the history and custom of the local community acknowledge and respected
within the frame of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.
The Act, however, also maintains that villages must remain under the guidance of
government regulation. Thus, while the law allows for more autonomy, higher levels of
government retain control (Bedner and Huis 2008).
Act No. 39 of 2014 on Plantation Development
Act No. 39 of 2014 addresses the rights of indigenous people in instances of land
appropriation. In Article 12(1), it states, “companies must consult indigenous land right
holders to obtain agreement on the delivery of land and compensation.” Further, Article
103 explicitly prohibits government officers from issuing permits of the land of
indigenous rights holders, and threatens a five-year prison term as well as a fine of five
billion rupiah (around US $350,000).
Constitutional Court Decision No. 35/PUU-X/2012 of May 2013
In 2013, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court affirmed the rights of indigenous
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peoples to their land and customary forests. In doing so, it extensively references human
rights instruments, including ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
(Coalition for Enforcement of Law 2017). It also amended Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry
Law, which said, “customary forests are state forests located in the areas of custom-based
communities.” The decision removed the word “state” from this definition, and thus now
says, “customary forests are forests located in the areas of custom-based communities.”
This affirmed that customary forests are no longer a part of state forests, and was a shift
from the classifications that had previously been established under the 1999 Basic
Forestry Law (Sari 2013, 21). However, how to establish customary forest, in practice,
remains unclear. Again, ambiguities surrounding land tenure policy hurt both indigenous
communities as well as the forests in which they live.
In some other ways, the situation in Indonesia has been improving. For one, the
Indonesian Constitutional Court has been central to the recognition of indigenous land
user rights. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the Court has emerged as one of the greater
successes of the Indonesian reformation movement, or reformasi. After its establishment
in 2003, it has been perceived as independent from other branches of government,
competent, and fair: a significant achievement given the corruption rampant in
Indonesia’s broader political environment (Butt, 2014, 60). Further, although the Court
has no enforcement powers, it has relied on its reputation and popular support to add
legitimacy to its decisions. However, the Court’s reputation has declined after a scandal
in 2013, in which the Court’s Chief Justice, Akil Mochtar, was arrested for allegations of
receiving bribes and money laundering (The New York Times 2014). Because of the
Court’s reliance on its reputation, this was a significant blow to its political and legal
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clout. Thus, it is unclear how scandals like this might impact the enforcement of its
rulings in the future.
Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
A draft bill, which was placed on a list of bills for the current House of
Representatives 2014-2019 term, would legally enshrine the rights of indigenous
Indonesians, following the 2013 Constitutional Court decision. In 2018, however, the
Indonesian government signaled that the bill was not likely to pass, dubbing it “not a
necessity,” and wrote that, if passed, it would create budget problems, spark conflicts,
and encourage indigenous beliefs contrary to the six religions recognized by the
government (Rogers 2016). While a number of more fragmented laws on indigenous
rights had been passed, this bill would have tied them together.
Controversy over the draft bill has had recent political implications. Although
current President Jokowi was labeled the first-choice candidate of AMAN during the
2014 presidential election because of his commitments to indigenous issues, AMAN has
since pulled its support for Jokowi in the upcoming April 2019 election. The former
President of AMAN, Abdon Nababan, has stated that AMAN now represents over 24
million indigenous voters, so Jokowi’s failure to push for the passage of the draft bill will
hurt his campaign (Gokkon 2019).
International Treaties
Additionally, Indonesia is now a signatory to the 2007 United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. While this commitment is non-binding, it
nonetheless enshrines rights that “constitute the minimum standards for the survival,
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world,” as well as their protection

58

59

under national and international law (United Nations Department of Economic and Social
Affairs 2007). However, the government has continued to dispute the concept of
indigeneity, claiming, in some instances, that all Indonesians are equally indigenous, with
the exception of the ethnic Chinese. This has created a basis for the government to reject
indigenous rights claims (Coalition for Enforcement of Law and Human Rights in Papua
2017). Of course, this stands in stark contrast to previous legislation and court rulings,
where the government has used language that explicitly acknowledges and recognizes the
existence of indigenous people and their rights.
The pathway to recognition of forest claims through adat law
The substantiation of forest claims through recognition of adat law is embedded
within the Indonesian national law framework, and requires that communities meet
several criteria. Whether or not communities meet these criteria is decided by an
independent committee of experts. These criteria are that “adat is practised according to
its rules; adat leadership/institutions still exist; territory is clearly established; and the
people still depend upon the forest.” (De Royer et al. 2015, 225)
However, one issue is that although the government requires formal, written
documentation to substantiate claims, when little conflict exists, people often turn to
informal forms of settlement, including through adat heads, rather than through legal
offices. This can lead to a lack of formal documentation. Furthermore, although some
groups had begun documenting their adat laws in the 1960s, other groups began more
recently. Thus, groups like the Iban, who have a long history of formal documentation,
may have stronger claims. Conversely, other groups who began the process of formal
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documentation more recently have had the opportunity to “construct” history with the
knowledge of how to use this history to their advantage (Ibid.).
Regardless, the Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, which has been stalled in the current House of Representatives, has
included some provisions to change the process. According to Arizona and Cahyadi
(2013), under the Bill, the recognition process would consist of three stages:
identification, verification, and ratification. Each stage, further, has its own set of criteria.
Within the identification stage, local communities must demonstrate a history of adat law
communities; adat territory; adat law; adat property rights, inheritance, and artifacts; and
a customary governance system. A community would be able to initiate the identification
process on its own, or may choose to work with the local government in doing so.
Following the initial identification process, the case would then be passed to the regency,
provincial, or state level Committee on the Indigenous Peoples, depending on the scope
of the claim, for verification. The criteria that these committees consider would be
distinct, and add an element reflecting customary land management by native peoples
more specifically.
If the case passes the verification stage, it then would be sent to the regent,
governor, or president for the third stage, approval. Who decides in the final verification
stage would depend upon the geographical scope of the claim; if the claim is limited to a
single regency, it is decided by the regent, while if the claim spans multiple provinces,
the president has the final decision. Communities then would be given the opportunity to
challenge the decision. There are, however, some issues here. For one, the model relies
heavily on non-independent, political actors, like the governor and president, who are not
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impartial. Because these actors are accountable to satisfying the needs of voters, for
example, it is conceivable that their decisions may be swayed by outside groups. Further,
national the government has signaled that it is unlikely to pass the Bill regardless.
Government programs
In addition to legislation, the Indonesian government has developed a number of
programs aimed at promoting conservation. These include forest certification and related
community-based forest management systems. Historically, the Indonesian government’s
attitude towards land tenure often negatively impacted the forest management behavior of
both communities and corporations. For one, as mentioned previously, the imposition of
state-created village government systems over preexisting adat governance systems
severely weakened adat institutions and reduced their ability to govern traditional forest
management effectively. The establishment of concessionaires and transmigrants in
forested areas created competition with local communities as well, and many of these
communities then were forced to cultivate on vulnerable forestland or to shorten fallow
periods. In response to these issues, the government introduced programs aimed at
enhancing the engagement of local communities in forest management (Liu, Faure, and
Mascini 2018). Two examples of these, forest certification schemes and communitybased forest management programs, will be discussed below.
Forest certification schemes
The Indonesian government’s forest certification schemes began in the 1990s,
when international NGOs began organizing boycotts of unethically-sourced timber (Liu,
Faure, and Mascini 2018, 40). Although initially the main purpose of forest certification
was to discourage illegal logging and promote sustainable practices, it now often
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emphasizes creating economic and social opportunities for local peoples as well (Harada
and Wiyono 2014). Two voluntary certification organizations now exist: the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Indonesian Eco-label Institute (LEI). Each of these
contain measures that require protections for indigenous peoples’ rights, and thus
represent one method that the government has used to try to balance the interests of
industry and local communities. It is important to note, as well, that although both LEI
and FSC are voluntary, timber companies often face significant pressure to obtain
certification. For example, Lowe’s, an American home improvement retail company, will
purchase Bornean wood only if it has been FSC certified (Lowe's n.d.).
Principles under the FSC, for example, specifically mention indigenous rights,
prescribing that customary rights to own, use, and manage their land and resources must
be respected, and that forest management must benefit local communities (Liu, Faure,
and Mascini 2018). Further, the FSC was initially established, in part, as a remedy for
some of the problems that community-based forest enterprises had faced when pursuing
certification, which included high costs of auditing, assessment, and implementation
(Harada and Wiyono 2014)
Similarly, LEI’s certifications include standards for ecological and social
sustainability, and require a community-based forest tenure system and that negative
impacts on local communities must be minimized (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 43).
Both LEI and FSC thus also set standards for community-based forest management
programs, which will be discussed further in this chapter. In addition to these voluntary
schemes, a mandatory certification program has been established under the Ministry of
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Forestry. However, the program has been criticized for a lack of independence and
transparency (Ibid, 41).
Another issue has been an absence of effective certification bodies that monitor
timber operations. International efforts to boycott timber that has been cut illegally have
aimed to reduce such practices, but without proper certification bodies, these efforts often
lack substance. For one, certification bodies sometimes issue certificates without proper
assessment. For example, the Koalisi Anti Mafia Hutan (Anti Forest Mafia Coalition)
found seven instances in which timber-processing companies in Papua New Guinea had
been issuing licenses despite processing wood sourced from illegally logged forests
(Syahni 2017).
And, when this occurs, legal consequences for violations often are not carried out
effectively. Little transparency exists regarding when these certification bodies, which are
supervised by the National Accreditation Committee and the Ministry of Environment
and Forestry, impose sanctions on timber companies for noncompliance (Cetera et al.
2018). Further, in some instances, the Indonesian government has been severely criticized
for its improper handling of offenses related to illegal logging. In one instance in 2014,
Labora Sitorus, a Papuan police officer, received a light sentence of two years in prison
and a fine of 50 million rupiah ($4250) for charges including money laundering and
illegal timber smuggling (Montesori 2014). A statement from the Environmental
Investigation Agency decried the case, saying it “highlights failings of [Indonesia’s] legal
timber system.” (Environmental Investigation Agency 2014a).
Conflict has also stemmed from involvement of regional governments in illegally
distributing forest resource extraction permits, which led to the Ministry of Forestry
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attempting to recentralize power through a series of ministerial decrees in 2000, with
regional governments continuing to issue such permits in spite of this through 2004 (Liu,
Faure, and Mascini 2018, 38). Thus, decentralization and subsequent efforts at
recentralization have been a recurring pattern. Again, ambiguity in the law is a
contributing factor. In addition to this, the illegal distribution of forest permits has often
encroached upon indigenous land. A case study of resulting conflicts between a
plantation company and several Dayak communities will be discussed later in this
chapter.
However, because of an increasing desire for sustainably-sourced timber in
markets in the EU, the US, and Australia, combined with a distrust for government
regulation in developing countries, third-party legality verification systems has been
created (Ibid.). One of these is the Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS), which
was established in 2009. In conjunction with this, in 2016 the government began issuing
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade timber export licenses. Licensed
Indonesian timber now is able to enter the European Union with much more ease;
conversely, non-licensed EU timber imports undergo a number of procedures to ensure
that it is sustainably sourced (Cetera et al. 2018). Because the program is relatively
recent, evidence of its effects is not yet available. However, some organizations, like the
World Resources Institute, have reported instances of “timber laundering,” in which
illegal timber is mixed in with legal timber, and both receive certification.
Community-based forest management
Legislation governing community-based forest management (CBFM) has also
been passed, following the government’s recognition of customary forests in 1990. While
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CBFM programs established under the Indonesian state do not grant ownership rights to
local communities, they allow varying degrees of participation in forest management
depending on the program. CBFM systems also necessarily vary with regard to the
characteristics of local communities, which include what types of timber and non-timber
products are extracted, as well as the degree of local communities’ dependency upon
them.
An important distinction relevant to CBFM and other community forestry
programs, then, is one of access and property. This was described Ribot and Peluso
(2003) in their “theory of access” outline. Issues unique to access represent, for the
Dayaks, pivotal factors that have the potential to protect or constrain their livelihood
strategies. Ribot and Peluso define access as “the ability to benefit from things—
including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols,” and property as the “right
to benefit from things.” Thus, the Indonesian government controls resource access
through its ownership of forest property, while communities, like the Dayaks, must work
through these institutions to maintain their access. One way in which this is achieved is
through the implementation of CBFM programs, where rights to access are facilitated by
the government, as the property owner and controller of access.
Several policies exist in both private forests and state forests to support CBFM in
Indonesia. Currently, all systems of community forestry are based on “core
memberships” of local communities that were often marginalized and seen as inferior
during the first few decades of forestry development following the 1970s (Sardjono and
Imang 2015). These systems are also complicated. Legally, a number of different
frameworks exist through which stakeholders may cooperate.
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Indonesia has three main community-based forestry schemes: community forest
(hutan kemasyaratkan) (HKm), private forest (hutan rakyat) (HR), and village forest
(hutan desa) (HD). A number of legal arrangements surrounding CBFM now exists in
Indonesia, but three are particularly relevant: The Village Forest, the Community Forest,
and the People’s Timber Plantation. It is important to note, though, that these programs
only cover state forest, and thus are not relevant to customary forest that now has been
classified separately from state forest. However, the area of forest land that actually has
been recognized through indigenous claims has been rather small1, and thus the reality is
that many of the Dayaks continue to rely upon state forest land, and these programs
therefore continue to maintain their relevance to Dayak livelihoods.
The Village Forest (Hutan Desa) secures forest use access of local communities
to forest resources. Again, it covers only state forest land, which is controlled by the
national government. Under the program, forest management is carried out by village
communities over a period of 35 years, with the possibility for a renewal covering the
following 35 years pending the approval of a long term work plan (Sari 2013, 38). In
addition, committees within the communities are responsible for regularly submitting
both annual and long-term plans to the provincial governor to secure their user rights.
Thus, the targets of the Village Forest exist at the village level. Because the other two
main programs, the Community Forest and the People’s Timber Plantation focus
primarily on community farmer’s groups, the Village Forest and its management by
village institutions is most relevant for the Dayaks. The permits issued under the program
1

President Jokowi’s promise to return 12.7 million hectares of land largely has been left
unfulfilled; as of 2017, titles to only 1.9 million hectares of forest land had been
distributed (Chandran 2018)
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may cover both protection and production forests if no conflicting rights or permits for
those areas exist, although the activities permitted differ depending on whether the forest
land is classified for production or protection (De Royer, Van Noordwijk, and Roshetko
2018, 170). For example, within a protection forest, only extraction of non-timber forest
products is allowed, while in a production forest, communities may extract both timber
and non-timber forest products.
The Community Forest (Hutan Kemasyarakatan) is focused on promoting the
welfare of communities living in and around forested areas by protecting their access to
forest resources (Sari 2013). Unlike the Village Forest, only community farmers’ groups
are eligible to apply for permits. However, the Community Forest program also applies to
national forest land that has been classified as production or protection forest, as long as
no conflicting permits exist. And, similar to the Village Forest, the types of activities that
are permitted differ depending on the classification of the forest land as well; non-timber
forest products may be extracted from both protection and production forest, but timber
forest products may be extracted only from production forest (De Royer, Van Noordwijk,
and Roshetko 2018, 170). Thus, Community Forest and Village Forest are very similar in
their scope, and mainly differ in their target populations.
The People’s Timber Plantation (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat) is aimed at accelerating
economic growth by focusing primarily on increasing timber production for local
communities, which, in theory, would reduce unemployment and poverty. Because the
focus is on timber production, however, the program only applies to production forest.
Similar to the Community Forest, the program is limited to community farmers’ groups.
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As mentioned above, of the three programs, the Village Forest is most relevant to
this thesis, first, because the Dayaks have participated significantly in the Village Forest
program, and second, because research on its effectiveness exists. In Kalimantan, the land
area classified as Village Forest has indeed been increasing. In 2012, around 144 square
kilometers had been classified in Village Forest, but by 2016, this had risen to 1,195
square kilometers (Santika et al. 2017, 62). However, in 2016, only 65 percent of Village
Forest land that had been granted to communities in Kalimantan had been intact forest
(with forest cover between 80 and 100 percent). Over 20 percent of the land granted had
already been severely degraded (with forest cover less than 40 percent)(Ibid.). Thus,
quality of the land, in addition to the quantity, is extremely important. Forest livelihoods
are of course heavily impacted by the quality of the forest upon which they depend. In
areas with severe forest degradation, the ability of local communities to reap the intended
benefits of CBFM schemes is significantly limited.
Regardless, the Village Forest program has been successful by some measures.
One aim of community-based forest management schemes, generally, is to promote
sustainable forest use. In Kalimantan, some research has demonstrated that the Village
Forest program has indeed helped avoid deforestation, although its effectiveness in doing
so has varied over different years and locations (Ibid.). However, significant issues also
exist. These have included a lack of monitoring, particularly in areas that are not
effectively managed, which has created opportunities for illegal logging. Another
problem is that, for the Dayaks, the Village Forest program does not adequately consider
the complexities of customary peoples’ claims (Fujiwara 2017). For one, the requirement
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that a map of the requested land area be provided makes it difficult for communities
experiencing conflicts over territory.
As will be discussed in the case studies later in this chapter, such conflicts are
particularly relevant in adat communities due to competition between groups with
ancestral ties to land and groups that had been moved to that land for various reasons.
Also important is the Village Forest program’s lack of emphasis on working alongside
existing adat governance structures that often have long-established rules regulating the
sharing of forest resources. This may worsen mistrust among communities and local
governments, particularly because state law takes precedent in any instances where
conflicts between state law and adat law exist.
A study by Fujiwara (2017) found that following the establishment of Village
Forest programs, some communities hurried to claim land use rights due to concern that
private corporations would grab the land. This led to a lack of preparedness for many
claims, where communities failed to reach agreements outlining Village Forest land and
its boundaries among communities. Furthermore, in some cases, oil palm plantations
were created on land that had already been approved for incorporation into the Village
Forest Program, which both affirmed and intensified already-existing fears that
corporations would seize land. Again, a significant issue is ambiguity. Generally, even
when permit requests are submitted, the process by which they are approved often is
extremely slow. The process of applying for permits also lacks accessibility, as many
communities are unaware of how to apply. However, the government has made efforts to
streamline the process. For example, a two-year moratorium was implemented in 2011 on
licenses for primary natural forests in order to create time to undertake forest governance

69

70

reforms (Austin et al. 2014). It has since been extended three times, and is now expended
to end in 2019 (Munthe and Jensen 2017).
Regardless, in part because of these problems, alongside perceived low financial
benefits from local management, some communities in West Kalimantan have preferred
private industry work (Langston et al. 2017). Thus, a significant issue in CBFM programs
in Kalimantan has been the continued presence of poverty for communities reliant on
forest resources, difficulties in securing access to such resources, and profitable
alternatives to convert forest land. Economic factors, then, may in some cases be
attractive enough to outweigh the potential benefits of local management and its
relationship with adat customs and increased conservation.
In addition, CBFM may consist of other agreements between private companies
and local communities (company-community partnerships), or between conservation
offices and local communities (Collaborative Conservation Management) (Liu, Faure,
and Mascini 2018, 39). Company-community partnerships have been implemented in
cases where, for example, a company is granted a concession for a timber plantation
where community members had claimed ownership, creating conflicts. In some cases,
community members might grow trees in partnership with private companies, and, in
return, receive a share of the profits (Nawir and Santoso 2005). Collaborative
Conservation Management, while often centered around conservation offices and local
communities, may also involve a multitude of stakeholders, including NGOs and other
government structures. However, the bargaining power of local communities is often
weak in comparison to that of companies and conservation offices, and thus, the rights of
these communities can remain limited (Ibid.).
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Furthermore, some forest certification schemes now include provisions that
encourage CBFM. The FSC, for one, has a community-based forest management scheme
that is also targeted at local communities, by allowing community producers to form
management units and apply for a single FSC certificate. While forest certification
schemes were once perceived negatively by some small or non-industrial operations,
partly due to concern over negative economic consequences and rising costs, these
smaller operations in recent years increasingly have been involved in forest certification
schemes (Maryudi et al. 2017) . And, forest certification schemes may improve local
peoples’ perceptions towards conserving forests and its potential financial benefits
(Harada and Wiyono 2014).
Case studies
While the government has referenced adat communities extensively in its legal
frameworks, in practice, little has been accomplished. One could be a perception that by
affording indigenous communities special protections and exclusive rights to natural
resources, revenue from resource extraction by larger corporations will fall. Another
issue is oversight. Indonesia’s monitoring and enforcement systems have remained weak,
and, combined with an ineffective judicial system, when indigenous land rights have been
violated, there has been little recourse (McCarthy and Robinson 2016). As will be
demonstrated below, this is intensified when the law is ambiguous. One of Elinor
Ostrom’s (1999) principles important to long-enduring common-pool resources
institutions, as discussed in Chapter Three, is that the resource should have clearly
defined boundaries. The lack of clearly defined boundaries, here, severely hampers the
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ability of local communities to manage their resources effectively. This section will
discuss barriers to indigenous claims in six case studies.
The first three case studies, from Central Kalimantan, Lombok province, and
West Sinjai, demonstrate issues of corruption and ambiguity in the law, as well as the
challenge governments face in balancing the interests of industry and local communities.
Another issue is the assumption that communities are unitary in their desire to assert
indigenous identity; because indigenous claims are recognized at the community level,
the reluctance of some members may hinder the claims of others.
The fourth and fifth case study, from North Kalimantan and West Kalimantan,
both pertain to challenges in claiming indigeneity to gain land tenure. As will be
discussed below, a significant issue is how definitions of indigeneity based on historical
ties to a particular tract of land can lead to intensified land conflicts between indigenous
groups. The problem is complicated, for one, by the fact that many indigenous groups
throughout Kalimantan have remained quite mobile, which severely weakens land claims
for some. Finally, the sixth case, from Indonesian Papua, will show the Indonesian
government’s impulse to retain control in the face of strengthening adat institutions.
Case Study: Gunung Mas, Central Kalimantan
In one instance, reported by the Environmental Investigation Agency in 2012,
Dayaks from nine Central Kalimantese villages in a formal letter to the sub-district
government rejected the proposal of an oil palm concession, and later attended meetings
with the regency and provincial government, reaffirming their objections (Environmental
Investigation Agency 2014b). The regency then reviewed the case and issued an
instruction banning the annexation of the forest on the basis that the communities held
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land rights there. The regency then instructed the company to map tenure claims within
the concession. Indigenous land within the concession was divided into individual land
and communally-owned land.
Subsequently, one Dayak community leader reported being offered a bribe from
the company for cooperation in establishing the oil palm concession. When he refused,
company representatives then asked community members to mark out the locations of
their holdings and then paid a flat rate per hectare. The company, however, had failed to
properly consider community land, and many community members sold much of their
communal land, even though the sale of community land also had been prohibited by the
regency government. Two months later, a third party was issued a permit to extract nearly
60,000 cubic meters of timber from within the concession. Thus, even though the
community had followed procedure in objecting to the proposal of the concession,
bribery, corruption, and ambiguity resulted in the issuing of the concession regardless.
This led to a loss of communal land, upon which Dayak livelihoods often rely heavily.
Case study: Rempek Village, Lombok
While located outside of Kalimantan, a case study of land tenure conflicts in
Lombok, an island West of Bali, illustrates issues of ambiguity in the law, corruption, and
the failure of government authorities to adequately address these conflicts, probably
because they were often involved in corrupt activities themselves. This case study draws
from the research of Langston et al. (2017), who studied Rempek village and its tenure
conflicts extensively.
Land ownership in Rempek has remained ambiguous since the first half of the
twentieth century, when the Dutch colonial authority demarcated forest boundaries and
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allowed farmers to cultivate land on its outer edges. Later, after Indonesian
independence, the Forest Agency established its own official forest borders in 1957, and
there was little dispute over these until the 1980s, when the district office began
permitting villagers to cultivate one square hectare of production forest per individual. It
is important to note that this permission granted land use, and not ownership. In 1984,
however, as part of the National Land Certification Scheme, land ownership certificates
within the area were distributed, and their recipients were district and sub-district
officials. Five years later, the government retracted its program that had allowed villagers
to plant within the production forest, thus creating significant conflict with local
communities, which refused to leave.
In 1991, the National Land Agency undertook a mapping and surveying project,
which suggested that the land, in actuality, belonged outside the forested area that was
under the ownership of the Ministry of Forestry, and thus belonged to the local
government instead. Nonetheless, the central government responded by issuing
concessions to a timber company to begin extracting timber within the area of dispute.
Conflict escalated, as villagers became emboldened by the support of the National Land
Agency and national NGOs. Efforts to establish community forestry projects later were
made by NGOs, but failed, as they did not address the boundary issues and thus
community members refused to accept the projects. Finally, in 2012, the NGO Samanta,
along with community members, established a community-based forest management
scheme. While members now receive user rights, the conflict is not yet resolved, from
their perspective, as land certifications have not yet been issued.
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The conflicts resulting from poorly defined land tenure in Rempek have had a
number of negative impacts on villagers. State forest in particular often lacks adequate
infrastructure, and thus roads are poorly maintained, making it difficult for children to get
to school, electricity is not supplied, and houses are ill-constructed. While the land claims
in Rempek do not have a customary basis, the villagers face similar issues that customary
communities do. Ambiguity in the law often leads to a distrust in government and can be
serious limitations to improving the livelihoods of local villagers, particularly in
scenarios when their livelihoods depend upon the conflicted land. Although natural
resource extraction is often justified in the name of national interested, as demonstrated in
this case, the negative impacts clearly affect some groups much more than others.
Case study: Turungan, West Sinjai
Conflicts between the national and regional governments are another potential
problem. One case documented by De Muur (2018) demonstrates first, a lack of cohesion
between the judiciary and the regional and local governments, and second, that a diverse
range of interests exists, even within a customary community that may appear to be
unitary to outside observers.
West Sinjai has experienced significant conflict land ownership conflicts between
the regional government and local communities since the mid-1990s. Many villagers in
West Sinjai live on state forestland and cultivate rice, coffee, and cloves. Some farmers
have suggested, though, that during the colonial era, the land was recognized as
community forest. Between 2009 and 2015 the regional forestry department arrested and
charged 15 local farmers with illegal logging in a state forest. In response, student
activists asserted that the arrests were motivated, in part, by regional government

75

76

officials’ interests in receiving annual reforestation funds from the central government.
These arrests, the activists argued, were used to demonstrate to the central government
that these reforestation funds were indeed necessary to rehabilitate forests that had been
degraded by local communities.
One farmer in particular, named Bahtiar, was encouraged by local activists and
AMAN to register his village community as a member of AMAN, which would entitle it
to AMAN’s legal services. In order to do so, though, he needed to prove that his
community indeed fit the legal definition of adat communities, which requires the
existence of adat laws, adat institutions, and a communal adat territory. According to
Bahtiar, his community easily met these requirements.
Although national legislation recognizing adat communities has been passed,
regional legislation has been lacking. Student activists had for years pushed for the
passage of regional legislation, but this was hampered by a lack of connections with
influential local officials. This was partly due to reluctance from some village members
to politicize their indigenous identity. Some members believed that customary rules and
institutions should be kept within the community, and thus were not interested in using
indigeneity as a means to claim land use rights. Thus, it is important while indigenous
status is applied to entire communities, members of these communities may have
interests that conflict with one another. In addition to this problem, officials from the
regional forestry department also believed that although communities in the area claimed
to be indigenous, they in fact were not, and were motivated only by the prospect of
obtaining more land.
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The failure of the provincial government to recognize Bahtiar’s adat rights
ultimately led to his conviction for illegal logging. In the end, the court ruled that adat
communities may only be recognized in court when they have already been recognized
by district regulations. Because the provincial government had not recognized the
community as indigenous, it was found that Bahtiar had no right to cultivate the land.
This also suggests that it is not the responsibility of the judiciary, but instead of regional
and local governments, to recognize adat communities.
Case study: Malinau, North Kalimantan
One case, mentioned earlier in this chapter, demonstrates the conflicts that may
arise from tenure claims that rely on definitions of indigeneity based on territoriality and
a history of occupation of that land. As is the case for many Dayak groups, history of use
and adat law constitute central bases for tenure claims in Malinau, a region of North
Kalimantan. Wollenberg, Moeliono and Limberg (2009) extensively studied conflicting
claims put forth by a number of groups, all indigenous to Kalimantan, although with
varying degrees of historical ties to Malinau. One group, the Kenyah, originally from
Pujungan, settled in Malinau with the permission of the customary head of the Langap, a
nearby village, in 1972. A decade later, the government resettled two Punan communities
in the same area. Around the same time, a Merap group from the Sengayan River also
moved to the area, resulting in four Dayak communities living nearby one another in
Malinau. Agreements on land use were made among one another based on adat law, as
well as with the nearby Langap village.
Little conflict existed between the four Dayak groups before commercial forest
clearing began in the areas, which opened up the forest for small-scale exploitation. Two
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of the groups, the Merap and the Kenyah, thus put forth land claims; the Merap claimed
they were the oldest settlers and the Kenyah emphasized their agreements with the
Langap village. Neither Punan communities had strong claims. The potential financial
benefits in compensation payments and fees led to a race in claiming forestland based on
adat.
This case study also demonstrates the processes through which adat rights are
recognized by the state. As mentioned previously, an independent committee of experts
first must verify that a number of criteria have been met. These criteria require that adat
law is still practiced, adat institutions still exist, territorial boundaries are clear, and the
communities continue to be reliant on forest resources. The continued existence of adat
law and its institutions tend to be more difficult to prove. Before the large-scale
exploitation of forest resources in Malinau began, for instance, the lack of conflict
between adjacent communities meant that there was little need for members to seek out
formal institutions for conflict resolution. Instead, disputes generally were settled through
informally by adat leaders, and thus little documentation exist. Further, since
Wollenberg, Moeliono, and Limberg’s research, the Punan had only recently begun
writing down their adat laws and history, and thus, in some ways, had an advantage in
that they were able to “construct” history to better fit their claims. The Kenyah and the
Merap, by comparison, had written their adat laws as early as 1968. Some interpretations
of history, in the end, further led to conflicts, though, as families from some communities
have claimed larger tracts of land based on asserted familial ties with past sultans.
Regardless, a major issue surrounding adat claims in Malinau has surrounded a
history of migration combined with settlements sponsored by the government, which has
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led to the establishment of four communities, all indigenous to Kalimantan, in one area.
While inland groups like the Kenyah were often more territorial, their territories were not
always permanent. Further, coastal groups like the Punan, which depended more heavily
on trade, were even more mobile. Again, claims that rely on historical attachment to
given areas remove bases for claims from groups recently settled in an area, including
communities that had been resettled by the government in the 1960s and 1970s. At the
time of the study, some Punan groups had moved from Malinau and returned to their
ancestral territories. The Punan, further, historically had remained quite scattered in small
groups, which even further weakens their claims to land tenure. Thus, while claims based
on historical presence are beneficial to some, they have the potential to severely constrain
sources of livelihood for potentially equally deserving others. The government has also
been reluctant to interfere when conflicts have arisen, creating anxiety for communities
with weaker claims that increasingly lack economic security.
Case study: Kapuas, West Kalimantan
The following case study, from Kapuas, West Kalimantan, will further illustrate
some of the issues related to indigenous claims to land tenure based on territory and prior
occupation. Specifically, such definitions of indigeneity often fail to acknowledge that
virtually all ethnic groups have been migrants at some point, and the Dayaks have been
particularly mobile.
This case study draws from the field work of De Royer et al. (2015), who studied
two villages in West Kalimantan. The first village, Manua Sadap, has been occupied by
Iban Dayak communities, while the second, Pulau Manak, has been occupied by
Embaloh Dayak communities.
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The Iban Dayaks are spread throughout northwestern Borneo, although their West
Kalimantantese population is relatively small compared to their population across the
Indonesian-Malaysian border, in Sarawak. Their migration from the up-river Iban region
in Sarawak began in the late 19th Century. The Embaloh Dayak communities, by contrast,
have been established in the area for at least twenty generations, and describe themselves
as the original inhabitants of the region. Both communities share Dayak cultural
practices; at the time of the study, many inhabited longhouses and practiced swidden
cultivation. However, both communities in recent years have experienced heightened
competition for land, which, accompanied by increased use of fertilizers and pesticides,
has forced communities to adapt their agricultural practices and cultivate fewer plots.
Non-farming employment was extremely low throughout the region, so both
communities further heavily relied on forest products as secondary sources of livelihoods.
This reliance has intensified conflicts, as both communities are dependent on access to
forests.
Historically, little conflict existed between the two groups. The Iban occupied
upstream, uninhabited areas of mature forest that had been unoccupied by the Embaloh
Dayaks, who settled in the lowlands near the Embaloh river. The relationship between
these two communities, further, was established through adat procedures, covering the
border between the two communities, river resources, and common forest properties.
Adat law was also used as the primary system of village governance within each of the
two communities.
The introduction of a UNREDD+ pilot program in the area intensified arguments
over forest boundaries and resource ownership, due to the program’s possible financial
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benefits. Because of this, both groups constructed historical claims to tenure. The
Embaloh asserted that because the Iban were relatively recent arrivals, the Embaloh
themselves were the legitimate owners. The Iban argued, on the other hand, that they
deserved land ownership and recognition because of their assistance to the Embaloh
during conflicts with Melayu groups. These conflicts led to the abandonment of some
previous adat agreements, which outlined, for example, shared ownership of a tract of
mature forest. In addition, definitions of indigeneity under UNREDD+, which link land
tenure claims to a historical occupancy of land, runs the risk of excluding particular
indigenous groups like the Embaloh. As Li (2007) notes, definitions relying on
geographic boundaries often restrict claims to isolated communities. Recognition that
customary land is often fluid and changing, instead, would broaden conceptions of
indigeneity, and recognize the diversity of Dayak groups and their often competing
interests.
Case Study: Indonesian Papua
A recurring pattern for the Indonesian government has been one of releasing and
reclaiming control. When the government decentralized after the fall of Suharto, for
example, provincial governments began distributing forest concessions at alarming rates,
prompting the national government to recentralize some of its control in forestry (Liu,
Faure, and Mascini 2018, 38). In Papua, alongside of Indonesian decentralization more
generally, were demands for Papuan independence, which prompted the central
government to grant the province special autonomy status. This has led to
decentralization laws in Papua and the province’s subsequent rise in the strength of its
adat institutions (Muhammad 2013). While outside of Kalimantan, the Papuan case
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illustrates the government’s desire to maintain control and its attempts to balance this
control with the increasing strength of indigenous movements. However, the Papuan case
has been intensified by threats from these secessionist movements, which perhaps
explains the government’s willingness to undertake more drastic measures in retaining
control (Ibid.).
Nonetheless, the passage of the Special Autonomy Law facilitated the establishment
of the Papua Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua), which claims to represent more
than 300 tribes in Papua. The Council has been praised for its strong democratic
legitimacy and pushing for the right to a livelihood, with an emphasis on customary land
tenure (Kayoi, Wells, and Shepherd 2008, 172). Yet, the Council has also repeatedly
criticized the Indonesian government, claiming, in a 2010 report submitted to the United
Nations Human Rights Council, that “human rights abuses by the state including
violations of the rights of Indigenous People”, that “there is no freedom of expression and
that the situation is steadily worsening in Papua”, and that “West Papuans2 are being
jailed, tortured, and killed for peacefully expressing their political opinion and desire for
decolonization and self-determination” (Papua Customary Council 2010). In response,
the government has refused to recognize the Council, leading to a lack of implementation
of concrete programs for Papuans (Dewi 2017).
Maryudi et al. (2017) reports that instead, the Indonesian government in 2010 created
the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat), using the

2

Papua refers to the Indonesian part of New Guinea, on the west side of the island. West
Papua and the province of Papua are distinct; West Papua separated from the province of
Papua in 2003, although the Papua Customary Council represents indigenous groups in
both provinces.
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name of a past institution that opposed the central government in the 1990s. The new
Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly, established with the support of the national
government’s Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, has tried to
remove the influence of the Papua Customary Council and increase support for the
central government’s own institution. While it has attempted to work at a grassroots
level, however, it has not garnered much popular support.
Another issue, according to Dewi (2010), is that under Papua’s Special Autonomy
Law, every policy implemented in Papua must first be approved by adat institutions. The
central government may then use the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly to
approve unilaterally any policies it desires. For example, the Papuan Customary
Deliberative Assembly has been brokering land to draw in foreign investments. This,
however, has come at the cost of overriding the village adat heads. In doing so, the
government has created the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly as its own adat
“proxy” institution to promote its own interests in Papuan development.
Government efforts to reclaim control from indigenous institutions in Papua are more
severe than in Kalimantan; it is likely that its behavior has been motivated, in large part,
by a perceived overstep from the Papuan Customary Council in criticizing the
government. Yet, the Papuan case does illustrate the trend in Indonesia of the rise in adat
institutions and the government’s general impulse to retain control. This may then help
explain why legislation like the Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples has so far failed to pass; that is, one concern is that the
government’s increasing support of indigenous rights is largely symbolic. Current
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President Jokowi, for example, has been repeatedly criticized by AMAN for his lack of
action on indigenous issues (Nugroho 2019).
Ostrom’s (1999) principles on common pool resource management call for autonomy;
that is, that government authorities should not infringe upon the rights of users to
establish their own institutions. The Indonesian government’s interventions, then, may
hamper the abilities of adat institutions under the Papuan Customary Council to manage
their forests in an effective manner.
Concerns
Valid concerns regarding creating avenues for forest tenure claims, however, have
also been raised. While the establishment and growth of large corporations clearly has
had negative impacts, positive impacts also exist. The government’s concern with
developing the national economy reflects this. The growth of industry is often associated
with the stimulation of local economies. This was the case, for example, in the industrial
revolution of the United States, where the exploitation of natural resources fueled the
immense speed with which the American economy flourished (Klein 2012).
Natural resource-intensive industries may also promote the growth of
transportation infrastructure and can create new venues for isolated populations to gain
access to resources like education and healthcare, both of which have great potential to
improve quality of life and social mobility. During the New Order, for example, logging
companies were often legally required to construct health and social facilities for local
communities (Tanasaldy 1981, 185). While, in theory, this should have had many
benefits for these communities, corruption of government officials and logging
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operations severely hampered the potential benefits (Ibid.). Thus, despite a requirement
for corporations to create social facilities, this was often not the case in practice.
On one hand, diversification of livelihoods, which for the Dayaks often relies on
access to forest resources, has a safety net function. Indeed, some research has attributed
livelihood diversification to helping families escape extreme poverty internationally
(Asfaw et al. 2015; Rist, Feintrenie, and Levang 2010; Ellis 1998). As described above,
many Dayaks rely on subsistence farming, often consisting of swidden agriculture, as
well as forest products and some non-farm work, which helps protect against the potential
volatilities of resource availability. On the other hand, other research has noted that other,
more specialized occupations, like those created by oil palm plantations and larger
industries, have greater poverty alleviation potential. This is particularly true in measures
of health care, education, and infrastructure (Rival and Levang 2014, 20; Gönner 2017,
48). For these reasons, many rural indigenous households now prefer occupations in
larger industries over farming and traditional forest use (Rival and Levang 2014). It is
also important to note, though, that historically, in many cases, industry has not provided
stable, long-term jobs for local populations. In Western Kalimantan, often the majority of
skilled-workers in plantations are not locals (Alqadrie 1990). Locals are also sometimes
perceived as uneducated, more difficult to deal with, and lacking the specific skills
needed by plantation operations (Tanasaldy 2012, 188).
Regardless, this has contributed to two different “moral economies” (Lounela
2017). On one hand, subsistence farming traditionally has encouraged a collectivist
orientation, where the emphasis has been on subsistence and the sharing of products
within communities. In opposition to this has been a shift to market dependency, where
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some now generate income from larger industries like the rubber economy. Changing
cultural values, then, is one effect. Gönner (2017) describes a dichotomy of the expansion
of oil palm and coal mining operations pushing and pulling livelihoods away from and
towards subsistence farming. The first scenario, the “push” of declining resources
availabilities, has been the primary focus of this chapter. It is concerned with issues
preventing some indigenous communities from accessing forest resources upon which
their livelihoods depend. The effect is that many turn to occupational opportunities
afforded by larger industries. The second scenario, the “pull” of industry and its potential
economic benefits, emphasizes the attraction, especially for many young people, of more
modern lifestyles that traditional agricultural practices simply cannot provide.
Whether or not industry has truly been beneficial to Kalimantese indigenous
peoples,
it is therefore important to emphasize the diversity of indigenous interests. Even outside
of economic interests, consider, again, the case study in West Sinjai. Some older village
members preferred not to register their community as indigenous because although they
identified as indigenous, they believed that their indigenous practices belonged within the
village, and should not have been exposed to outsiders (Van Der Muur 2018).
Regardless, the political climate borne out of reformasi has brought with it a
proliferation of identity politics and heightened demands for community control over
customary land and resources. One effect has been increased tensions among ethnic
groups. This has included conflict between Dayak and non-Dayak groups, such as Dayak
violence against the resettled Madurese in the 1990s, described in Chapter Two, as well
as conflict within Dayak groups, such as the above-mentioned conflicting claims between
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the Punan and the Kenyah in the Malinau region (Larrabure and Moeliono 2013). While
cultural identity for the Dayaks has long been political, this has become particularly
salient after the Constitutional Court in 2013 ruled requiring indigenous land claims to be
accompanied by the existence of adat institutions and other adat-related criteria
described above.
Assertions of indigenous identity, then, have become inextricably linked to
decentralization, as indigenous communities have emerged as powerful interest groups in
the realm of Indonesian politics. AMAN, for example, played a pivotal role in supporting
the passage of the 2013 Constitutional Court decision and then by exerting pressure on
President Jokowi to pass pending legislation in accordance with the Court decision.
AMAN, as a representative of a large voter base, is also likely to impact the April 2019
election cycle. However, an AMAN representative in February 2019 stated, “There is no
strong reason for choosing Jokowi since six out of the nine development programs he has
promised have not yet materialized. There is no reason to choose Prabowo either since he
has never brought up indigenous people’s issues” (Nugroho 2019). The prioritizing of
indigenous interests in these campaigns, or lack thereof, may be an important signifier of
the future direction of indigenous tenure rights, particularly because criticisms of current
President Jokowi include his failure to fulfill his own campaign promises of pushing for
the passage of the Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Ibid.).
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Chapter 5: Recommendations
To summarize, a fundamental concern for the Dayaks is one of claims to forest
land. Fujiwara (2017), drawing from a diverse body of literature outlining the challenges
that communities face in gaining resource access, identifies three broad categories:
regulatory procedures, roles among actors, and resources. The Dayaks, unfortunately,
have faced all three challenges. Because the Dayaks as an indigenous group also face
issues of defining indigeneity in addition to these challenges, such issues will be
discussed as well. Thus, this chapter will be structured into these categories, and
recommendations will be suggested within each.
Regulatory procedures
Within barriers created by regulatory procedures is the critical issue of
ambiguities in the law, which has been a common theme throughout this thesis. It
hampers the ability of communities, first, to obtain recognition of their indigenous status,
and second, to benefit from the rights that should follow in theory.
The first issue is related directly to Indonesian law, as decisions made regarding
why some groups are granted status yet others are denied is oftentimes unclear. Even
definitions of indigenity, to start, are ambiguous and are a source of contention. For one,
conceptions of indigeneity put forth by intergovernmental organizations, such as in the
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, emphasize historical ties to a
particular tract of land, yet in Indonesia, the reality is that many West Kalimantese
indigenous groups have been rather mobile. Uncertainty in how to define indigineity,
further, can be a difficult issue for the government as well as for indigenous peoples.
Even when the government is well-intentioned, it is extremely difficult to identify what
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tracts of land ought to be granted to which groups, particularly because mobility is a
necessary component of livelihood strategies for many Dayak groups.
With regard to the second issue, ambiguity may also lead to anxieties from
indigenous communities in securing their land rights, which in some cases has created
competitive environments where groups scramble to apply for land without being fully
prepared for the application process. And, the lack of preparedness has sometimes led to
the rejection of such rights claims. In other cases, even some communities that had their
claims recognized later found that the government allowed oil palm plantations to be
constructed on their land (Fujiwara 2017).
A possible explanation is the impulse of the Indonesian government to retain
control. Shlager and Ostrom (1992) describe the necessity for governments to protect the
rights of local users to manage their resources. Yet, ambiguity in some cases may be used
as a tool for governments to retain power. The Supreme Court’s 2013 recognition of
indigenous land as distinct from state land and the Indonesian House of Representatives’
subsequent failure to pass concrete legislation enforcing the decision is one example
among many (Rogers 2016). Ambiguity allows the government a degree of flexibility in
the law’s invocation, and while decentralization has indeed increased decision-making
power among local communities, ambiguity has remained a critical issue, as national,
provincial, and local governments often are not equally informed.
One means to address the government’s tendency to maintain control is through
the co-management of resources in community forestry, wherein both the government
and the community would share power. This has been the focus of many community
forestry efforts, and in Indonesia this often takes the form of community access rights on
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state-owned land. Indeed, formal CBFM systems in Indonesia, like the Village Forest,
exist in state forest and thus deal with access, and not ownership. On one hand, comanagement of forests has been quite effective in some cases in Indonesia (Bock 2012).
For the Indonesian government, co-management can be particularly attractive because it
allows local communities to participate in forest governance, yet some state-control can
be maintained. On the other, though any improvements in such systems surely would be
valuable, one concern is that the existence of such systems could be used as a means to
justify government retention of customary lands. Because communities already have
access, it then becomes easier to deemphasize the need for customary ownership.
Of course, claiming indigeneity for customary land rights is a separate matter. The
current state of affairs in Indonesia is that, in actuality, a relatively small area of land
ownership has been granted to indigenous communities. Thus, many communities
continue to rely on community-based forest management systems that focus on access
rather than ownership. While ideally, passing legislation that more concretely affirms the
rights of indigenous people to customary land ownership would remove issues of access
to government-owned land, improving and protecting such access in instances where
ownership has not yet been granted is also necessary.
Interactions among actors
Problems of interactions, for the Dayaks, are related to feelings of distrust among
communities and governments at different levels, which often are fueled by difficulties in
negotiating an intricate, often corrupt, political system. Decentralization, again, has
complicated the issue further. In some cases, the interests of different layers of
government have been openly at odds with one another. One example is the Ministry of
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Forestry’s 2000 decision to recentralize control on the issuing process of forest extraction
permits and provincial governments continuing to issue the permits in spite of this,
leading to serious forest degradation (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018). Regional
governments profited from the sales of these permits, much to the chagrin of the Ministry
of Forestry, which had recentralized, in part, to aid in natural resource conservation. In
other cases, the issue has been a lack of communication, which sometimes led to officials
simply not knowing about certain programs. This was indeed the case with the
establishment of a 2014 moratorium on issuing new licenses to convert primary forests
and peatland, where often lack of enforcement was due local officials not knowing about
the moratorium (Austin et al. 2014).
Corruption represents yet another problem, and likely is a significant contributor
to general feelings of distrust between indigenous communities and governments at all
levels. In the same instance, mentioned in the previous paragraph, where provincial
governments continued to issue forest extraction permits despite the Ministry of
Forestry’s prohibitions, a chief motivator was corruption—some officials directly
profited from the corrupt distribution of such permits to logging concessionaires (Hohne
et al. 2018). Ostrom’s (1999) second principle on common pool resource management,
then, which asserts that participants must perceive the rules assigning benefits and the
rules assigning costs as fair, is directly inhibited by such corruption and the mistrust of
officials that it breeds.
One solution might be the introduction of effective mediators with the capacity to
facilitate political negotiations with which indigenous groups often lack experience. A
critical part of building back trust from local people is communication, or what Brown et

91

92

al. (2002) has dubbed, “turning ‘participation’ into ‘citizenship’”, where community
members perceive themselves as active stewards of forest resources, rather than passive
participants in their extraction. Hopefully, the presence of mediators would also help
reduce corruption, as increased monitoring as well as knowledge of application
processes, in theory, should work to deter resource misuse.
Yet, at the same time, some evidence suggests that increased numbers of
mediators do not necessarily lead to increased recognition of indigenous land rights
claims (Lane 2002). Thus, not only is the existence of mediators important, but also their
quality. A number of different organizations in the past have provided mediation
effectively; indeed, NGOs and organizations like the United Nations Development
Program have provided capacity-building services in social forestry programs with some
success (Danks and Jungwirth 1990; Kleine 2009; Rawlani and Sovacool 2011). It is
important to note though, that in order for management to be facilitated, indigenous
communities must first be provided with secure rights. Thus, AMAN, the primary NGO
representing indigenous peoples’ interests in Indonesia, has been involved heavily in
advocating for the recognition of customary land, which of course is fundamentally
necessary for obtaining land ownership to start.
Also related to mistrust of actors has been increasing suppression of political
dissent in recent years. In February of 2019, a group of United Nations from the Human
Rights Council called for investigations into multiple cases of alleged killings and illegal
arrests of indigenous Papuans, in response to an online video of a young indigenous
Papuan handcuffed, with a snake wrapped around him, during a police interrogation
(Raavad 2019). Representatives of the Indonesian police force have since apologized, but
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this represents, as described by the UN, “tactics… often used against indigenous Papuans
and human rights defenders… symptomatic of the deeply entrenched discrimination and
racism that indigenous Papuans face, including by Indonesian military and police” (Ibid.).
This particular case is more extreme than what has been observed in Kalimantan
generally, but it nonetheless represents significant barriers that indigenous groups
continue to face. Furthermore, suppression of dissent is still felt strongly by the Dayaks;
one leader attending a conference on indigenous rights in March of 2016 stated, “we did
all we could to protect the forests. We tried to seek help from local government but
instead were blamed, captured, criminalized for defending out own lands” (Satriasanti
2016). Even minor voicings of dissent increasingly have faced punishment: in March of
2019 a university professor was sentenced to four years in prison for singing an old antiarmy song at a rally in Jakarta (Paddock 2019). One concern, then, is that criticisms
against the government could lead to repercussions that might include, in addition to
unfair arrests and alleged killings, revoking access, particularly if indigenous groups are
perceived as noncompliant.
Resources
A lack of resources has been another barrier to recognizing Dayak customary land
claims. Often this has included a lack of knowledge necessary for navigating processes
like permit applications, which is worsened by the changing nature of Indonesian forestry
policy that can make it difficult to remain up to date. A researcher at the Center for
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) aptly summarized the issue: “One of the major
challenges causing slow forest tenure reforms is the lack of knowledge of people on the
ground on its legal aspects and stages of the reform process” (Shahab 2018). An example
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of this is the requirement for formal documentation for indigenous status applications.
Groups that began this documentation process more recently, with knowledge of the
criteria that must be met, thus are able to report history to their advantage (De Royer et
al. 2015). Because this knowledge is so important, then, capacity-building is a promising
option, where technical experts provided by NGOs or other or organizations may support
communities in maximizing the strength of their claims. Capacity-building indeed has
helped realize community welfare in Indonesian social forestry systems (Pujo et al.
2018), although it is important that the unique situation of the Dayaks are recognized.
This has been a significant pitfall of current CBFM systems, like the Village Forest, in
their effectiveness for indigenous peoples.
The government has indeed made efforts to streamline access to programs like the
Village Forest, which, with support from organizations like CIFOR shortened its
application procedure time from between two and three years to between 24 and 37 days
(Shahab 2018). In conjunction with this, CIFOR also released a guidebook to aid both
local communities and implementing agencies in navigating the different phases of
applications for CBFM schemes. Similar support for indigenous communities seeking to
apply for indigenous status recognition, then, might be an effective option.
In addition to a lack of resources at the community level, a lack of resources at the
subnational government level also exists. Generally, the capacity of subnational
governments in Indonesia has remained low; infrastructure and economic strength remain
concentrated in economic capitals, and lobbying for funds from Jakarta continues to be a
common strategy, despite improvements from decentralization (Wollenberg, Moeliono,
and Limberg 2009, 283). In addition, Indonesian government system was, in many ways,
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simply unprepared for the speed with which decentralization occurred. Following
decentralization, the majority of officials had had little or no experience with local
government, and while many found the ideas of democracy appealing, they lacked
knowledge on how to employ these ideas in practice (Ibid.). All of this resulted in the
overlapping and often overly complex system that has been particularly difficult to
navigate for indigenous communities. Up until the fall of Suharto, the Dayaks as a group
had remained, for the most part, excluded from politics, and thus also had little
experience in navigating political systems as well. Many of those initially excited by
decentralization returned to their old, informal networks with the bureaucracy after
realizing the complexities brought by these changes (Ibid.).
Defining indigeneity
A final and fundamental barrier is one of defining indigeneity. As discussed earlier in
this chapter, significant issues exist in the ways in which indigeneity is defined by the
international community, and in how it applies to Indonesia. The United Nations Manual
for National Human Rights Institutions notes that while no formal definition has been
adopted in international law, it lists factors, developed by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which are important to the understanding
of indigeneity. These include, among other factors, “priority in time, with respect to the
occupation and use of a specific territory” (2013, 7).
While indigenous groups should indeed have rights to their ancestral land, it is
difficult to decide for which groups and in what situations indigenous status should be
granted. And definitions of indigeneity among the international community have also
remained ambiguous, partly in order to retain flexibility, as the situation of indigenous
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peoples varies widely across different countries. For the Dayaks, though, it is clear that
frequent mobility leading to competing claims means that the government is indeed in a
difficult situation in mediating conflicts and making decisions about recognizing
indigenous status.
Even within indigenous groups, significant conflict has existed. The case study
mentioned in Chapter 4, documented by Rhee (2009), in which the Merap and the
Kenyah labeled their own communities indigenous and labeled the other communities
newcomers demonstrated the complexities of the situation. While both communities are
indeed indigenous to Kalimantan, indigeneity to a specific area, or tract of land, also
becomes important. Because of this, indigenous groups like the Kenyah, who have
migrated to newer areas for various reasons, find themselves in difficult situations
wherein they lack strong claims to their new land, yet have left their old land, perhaps
without the possibility for return.
Again, the development interests of larger industries must be considered as well.
Thus, it is not surprising that land conflicts have been so prevalent. Interests of
indigenous groups, other local communities, and industry must be balanced, and often
this has led to groups scrambling to compete with one another to file claims (Fujiwara
2017). At the same time, though, the process by which indigenous claims are recognized
can also help affirm and strengthen state control over land governance because the state
then remains the authority on recognizing indigeneity. Some research also has discovered
that the indigenous groups best connected to local government officials are more likely to
have their land rights recognized (Van Der Muur 2018, 171). Promoting accountability
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and transparency by increasingly involving actors external to the decision-making
process, as well as raising awareness of applications, might help mitigate this issue.
Regardless, recognizing indigenous groups based on the maintenance of indigenous
institutions is a reasonable start, and has contributed to growing indigenous movements
throughout Indonesia. And, the strength of these movements is indeed important in
promoting indigenous rights. For example, AMAN has repeatedly used its large,
reportedly 24 million-strong member base to exert pressure on political actors (Nugroho
2019). The strength of social movements, furthermore, often depends quite heavily on the
successful creation of a robust collective identity. While it is important to note that the
Dayaks are indeed a diverse set of indigenous communities, the collective cultural
identity upon which the Dayak indigenous movement has based itself has been critical to
community mobilization. As a discussion paper published by the Biodiversity Support
Program aptly notes, “People move from seeing themselves as weak to seeing themselves
as resourceful shapers of their own destinies” (2000, 96). Such collective beliefs, further,
can help weave together a larger polity from often disparate, competing communities.
NGOs and other organizations also may play an important role in facilitating
community resilience and utilizing collective cultural identity. With such support, Dayak
groups could become more able to participate in processes like territory mapping, filing
land claims, and documenting adat laws, all of which help substantiate claims to
indigenous identity, and later, customary land ownership. Providing support to grassroots
organizations or community alliances is one way in which this could be achieved. While
external NGOs may indeed play a critical role in providing such support, it is further
important that such external organizations do not compete with grassroots community
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groups, and instead focus efforts on capacity building. Local empowerment has been a
critical factor in the establishment and strengthening of the Dayak social movement since
the fall of Suharto (Alcorn and Royo 2000).
One important question, though, will be whether indigenous groups that have moved
from land with which they have historical ties will be granted land elsewhere. Often such
groups have moved out of necessity. Corporate land-grabbing, for one, has been a
significant factor that has forced some groups to move to other areas, often creating or
intensifying land conflicts. Because of this, the scale of indigeneity is important. A group
might be indigenous to Indonesia as a whole, or to Kalimantan, or to a particular tract of
land within Kalimantan. Land rights claims based on indigeneity relate directly to this
issue of scale. For example, if an indigenous West Kalimantese group has been displaced,
one question is whether or not its customary land claim is legitimate. It depends on scale:
whether the group’s broader indigeneity to West Kalimantan is enough to qualify it, or if
its newcomer status on a smaller scale disqualifies it.
Currently, the answer is ambiguous. The reality is that although the government
indeed has made significant strides in recognizing customary land as separate from state
land, the vast majority of Dayak groups, including those who have indeed been classified
officially as indigenous, have not yet seen their customary land claims realized. Because
only small areas of land in actuality have been recognized as customary, it is unclear how
this issue will be addressed. One solution might be to reclassify state land as customary
land for displaced indigenous groups, despite a lack of historical ties to their new area.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), in the United States, takes an approach such that when land is irretrievably
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polluted, amenities in a new tract of land are adapted to match the amenities of the
previous tract of land (Environmental Protection Agency n.d.). This model might have
potential for indigenous groups in Indonesia, in that the government conceivably has an
obligation to provide land for displaced groups. These groups often have been displaced
due to state action, such as the sale of extraction permits to logging corporations that
encroach upon customary land.
It is important, though, that the quality of this land is considered. As mentioned in
Chapter 4, this indeed has been an issue in the Village Forest program. Over 20 percent
of the land that had been granted to local communities for use had already been severely
degraded, with forest cover of less than 40 percent (Santika et al. 2017, 62). Another
concern is the potential for triggering a cascade of degradation, where the movement of
displaced communities from one tract of land to another might lead to increased forest
degradation. One argument that has been raised throughout this thesis has been the
sustainability of indigenous forestry practices. Shifting cultivation, for one, has been
demonstrated to be quite sustainable, protect greater biodiversity, and has contributed to
less deforestation than alternative farming practices (Soedjito 2015, 420). It is also
important, though, that enough territory necessary for shifting cultivation is maintained.
There must be enough land for fallow periods to be given ample time to regrow before
they are cultivated again. And, the monitoring functions that indigenous communities
provide, if they perceive themselves as active stewards of forest resources, could protect
land from degradation produced by extraction industries and illegal activity like
poaching.
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Further, another concern is whether or not indigenous groups should be required to
maintain their adat institutions after indigenous status has been granted. Even though a
resurgence in Dayak pride has occurred, some young Dayaks have indicated desire to
associate themselves with modern lifestyles, and because of this it is possible that the
preservation of adat institutions could be perceived as a hindrance (Gönner 2017). In
Thailand, for example, many young, rural Northeasterners seasonally migrate to Central
Thailand, in part in search of higher income, but also due to a desire to associate
themselves with the modern, consumerist culture prevalent in cities (Camfield, Masae,
and Mcgregor 2013). It is therefore conceivable that rural peoples from less populated
islands in Indonesia may begin to migrate to urban areas. Thus, one issue is that this
might legitimize the Indonesian government revoking indigenous status and thereby
customary land rights. An emphasis on ownership rather than access is again important,
as this would protect indigenous land rights more permanently.
Summarizing recommendations
To summarize, a number of barriers exist for indigenous groups seeking
recognition of customary land rights. Ambiguity in regulatory procedures has been a
major barrier, where indigenous communities often have trouble navigating the complex
and multilevel political and legal systems in Indonesia. A lack of resources also exists
both for communities and for local governments, wherein a lack of knowledge worsens
the consequences of these ambiguities. Streamlining processes like permit applications
and creating manuals targeted at local officials and community members, which in the
past have been spearheaded by CIFOR, could help mitigate this issue. It is important to
remember, as well, the unique situation of indigenous peoples in Kalimantan, as adat
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institutions and practices must be respected. Recall that the maintenance of these
institutions is a necessary requisite for legitimizing claims to customary land.
In addition, a corrupt political system, where different layers of government often
compete with one another, is another problem. This has fed into heightened conflict
between local communities and government officials, particularly where land rights are
threatened. The government also actively has repressed political dissent, and this issue
has worsened in recent years. All of these interactions have fed into a general mistrust of
the government. Increased involvement of community members in political processes
could help promote openness and transparency, and as a result, could help reduce
corruption.
Lastly, conceptions of indigeneity are important. The construction and
reinforcement of a collective identity has been a key component of encouraging the
maintenance of Dayak adat institutions and the strengthening of the Dayak social
movement. Such collective identities are fundamental to political movements
internationally, and NGOs often have the capacity to aid in facilitating this. This indeed
has been the strategy of AMAN, as an indigenous interest group, which as a result has
been able to exert political pressure through its large voter based. Due to discontent with
both candidates running in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, AMAN participated
in a growing social media movement, “#SayaGolput”, translating, roughly, to abstaining,
or casting a blank vote. As stated previously, many indigenous groups have been
frustrated with President Jokowi’s failure to meet previously made promises on
improving Indonesia’s human rights record (Nugroho 2019).
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Regardless, the resurgence in Dayak pride in large part has been a welcome
consequence of decentralization, as indigenous communities and their role in local
governance has been realized. And, this resurgence has helped strengthen the indigenous
movement throughout Indonesia, which has been met with some success in the
government’s recognition of customary land rights claims. Significant progress must still
be made, however, in securing customary land rights. It is important to note that while the
government in many cases has granted access, through programs like the Village Forest
program, and many improvements to such programs could indeed be made, the
government has done little to grant ownership. And, this ownership would protect
indigenous land permanently, increase community involvement and self-perceptions as
active agents in forestry, and in doing so, aid in both security of indigenous livelihoods
and protecting biodiversity in Indonesia’s forests.
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